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The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of the change from Basel II to Basel 
III on the profitability of the South African banking sector. South African banks are 
regulated in accordance with the Basel Accords and, as such, this study reviews the 
literature on bank regulation and specifically the evolution of the Basel Accords. The 
2008 global financial crisis exposed certain flaws in the global regulatory framework and 
paved the way for the introduction of Basel III, of which South Africa commenced 
implementation on 1 January 2013. As mentioned, the review of banking regulation 
literature will specifically focus on the changes from Basel II to Basel III, with a further 
focus on two of the key changes introduced by Basel III: the capital requirement 
amendments and the new liquidity ratios. The study examines the top five banks in 
South Africa, as these make up 91.1% of the industry’s banking assets (as of December 
2012). The top five banks are used to create a representative bank of the South African 
banking sector and an accounting model is performed using a DuPont analysis in order 
to measure profitability. With respect to the Basel III capital changes, the results show 
that a 2% increase in capital by increasing the equity-to-asset ratio and all else held 
equal will result in a decrease of 0.29% in return on equity (ROE) for the South African 
banking sector. With respect to the Basel III liquidity measures, a 25 basis decrease in 
maturity transformation, all else held equal, will translate into a 3.38% decrease in ROE. 
The study contributes to the recent literature on Basel III and profitability. The results 
will also benefit the South African banking industry and regulators when assessing the 
profitability impact of the new Basel regulations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last few decades, financial markets have rapidly changed and developed, driving 
evolution in the banking industry and bank regulation. There has been a move from 
periods of regulation to deregulation in the 1980s, to current attempts at a system wide 
macroprudential regulatory policy. One of the most important rationale for bank 
regulation is to provide a stable banking and financial sector (Barth, Caprino & Levine, 
2006:8). Bank failure or a bank crisis can have severe systematic consequences, with 
bank failure or a banking crisis leading to severe systematic consequences, hence 
making bank regulation fundamental. 
Specifically capital adequacy regulation has received notable attention in recent 
decades. Optimal regulation and many positive features can be achieved through 
capital adequacy standards (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994). A bank’s capital serves as a 
buffer against losses. Lind (2005:26) explains that capital is needed to reduce volatility 
in banks’ earnings and to encourage prudence amongst bank owners as their own 
capital is at stake. Banks with sufficient capital are better able to manage their risks and 
reduce their chances of bank runs and failures (Dupuis, 2006:1). Capital ratios were 
introduced as a method to establish minimum regulatory requirements within the 
banking sector, but were only imposed as an international benchmark after the 
numerous banking crises of the 1980s (Balthazar, 2006:15). 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) develops guidelines for bank 
regulations and recommends best practices that banks should follow (Casu, Girardone 
& Molyneux, 2006). The BCBS – headquartered at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) – was formed following the failure of the Bretton Woods system of 
managed exchange rates in 1973 that resulted in financial market turmoil. The aim of 
the committee is to bring stability to the financial sector by improving global banking 
regulation and supervision (Bank for International Settlements, 2014:1). The BCBS was 
initiated by the central bank governors of the G10 countries and officially sets 
international guidelines for banking regulation. Professor Goodhart (2011) mentions that 
the “BCBS has become a de facto international regulatory body”, although their 
publications do not have any legal standing. Instead, the BCBS draw up broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines with the expectation that authorities worldwide will 
implement them in a manner that best suits their own national systems. In this way, the 
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BCBS encourages convergence towards common practices and standards (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2001:2). Ultimately, the decision to implement any of the 
BCBS standards rests with the central banks of individual countries. 
The Basel Committee enhanced their inclusiveness and acceptability by expanding 
membership in both 2009 and 2014. Originating from the G10 countries, it now includes 
28 jurisdictions (Bank for International Settlements, 2014). The main Basel Committee 
achieves its responsibilities through several subcommittees, which have been set up to 
produce new regulatory standards, as well as to review the impact of changing 
regulations, the effectiveness and consistency of implementation and the convergence 
between banking and other standard-setting regimes (SARB, 2014:11). 
Due to several crises in the 1980s and the increasingly interconnected nature of the 
global financial system, a strong need for coherent, global banking regulation emerged. 
As a result, and in an effort to bring stability to the banking and financial sectors, the 
BCBS released the 1988 International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (known as Basel I). Basel I introduced a basic risk weighted capital 
adequacy ratio that has become the foundation of banking regulation. The ratio, which 
only considered credit risk, was set at 8%. The omission of other important risks were 
criticised and due to this, together with many other weaknesses of Basel I, the BCBS 
eventually released their second Accord, Basel II, in 1999. There were several 
shortcomings to Basel I but, according to Lind (2005:24), the overarching reason for the 
adoption of Basel II was due to the significant change in banking instruments and 
operations since the inception of the first Accord. 
Basel II was approved by the BCBS in 2004 and maintained the capital adequacy ratio 
from Basel I. The new Accord also addressed market and operational risk in conjunction 
with credit risk. The aim of Basel II was to improve capital regulation and further 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system by 
encouraging banks to improve their risk management policies (Bank for International 
Settlements, 1996:1). In contrast with the first Accord, Basel II was based on three 
pillars: (1) the minimum capital requirement; (2) the supervisory review; and (3) market 
discipline. However, like its predecessor Basel II had shortcomings and the 2007 
financial crisis raised serious questions around global regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks. The global financial crisis exacerbated these shortcomings and called for 
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weaknesses in global banking regulation to be addressed. Basel II was shown incapable 
of protecting banks against failures, which is an important rationale for bank regulation. 
Further modification to the Accords was required, and in 2010 the BCBS published 
Basel III with an effective date of implementation from 2013. The 2007 crisis brought 
issues such as leverage and poor liquidity to the attention of regulators, which the new 
Accord attempts to address. Basel III not only enhances the current capital regulation 
built under the previous Accords but also incorporates a system-wide macroprudential 
approach. The major changes from Basel II to Basel III will be addressed in Section 2. 
Although emerging market economies were not intended to be included in the Basel I 
framework, many adopted its recommendations (Balin, 2008). Similarly, despite Basel 
II being designed for the G10 countries, many nations outside the G10 adopted the 
framework as it was structured in a manner that both developed and developing 
countries could adopt (Mboweni, 2004:5). 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the central bank of South Africa and is 
responsible for bank regulation in South Africa. Specifically, the Bank Supervision 
Department (BSD) of the SARB is responsible for prudential supervision of banks. South 
African banks are regulated in accordance with the Basel Committee’s 
recommendations on banking supervision (Mboweni, 2004:1). Furthermore, South 
Africa is a member of the Basel Committee, having joined in 2009. South African banks 
are public companies registered under the Banks Act, 1990. South Africa commenced 
implementation of Basel III on 1 January 2013 and will follow the official phase in period 
until 1 January 2019. As part of the Basel III monitoring, South Africa has to submit data 
to the Bank of International Settlements. 
The regulatory reform introduced by the Basel Accords has raised questions around the 
impact on profitability for the banking sector. The global financial crisis serves as a 
reminder of what the potential impact on overall economic activity should banks’ 
profitability levels be severely impacted. Despite the recent increase in studies on Basel 
III, the impact on profitability remains unclear. Now that the 1 January 2013 Basel III 
commencement date has passed and South Africa is within the phase in period, focus 
has shifted to implementation and the impact of the new measures. From a basic 
accounting perspective, an increase in capital requirements under Basel III should 
reduce return on equity (ROE). Also holding shorter term, lower yielding assets in order 
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to meet the Basel III liquidity ratios should reduce return on assets (ROA). Banks are 
able to pass on these increased costs to borrowers by, as an example, increasing 
lending rates, which can offset the fall in ROE (King, 2010). 
The regulatory changes under Basel III may therefore encourage South African banks 
to increase lending rates in order to counter the lower profitability effect. A higher charge 
on loans can have further macroeconomic knock-on effects and studies like Slovik and 
Cournède (2011) evaluate the Basel III impact on lending spreads and GDP growth. 
Increased lending rates are likely to affect credit growth for South African banks and 
also depress economic activity. A measure of the direct impact of Basel III on South 
African banking profitability is therefore important and has been discussed and modelled 
in this study. The study focuses on the tighter capital and new liquidity requirements 
proposed by the Basel Committee. The five major South African banks are used to 
create a representative bank of the South African banking sector and an accounting 
approach is adopted to measure profitability. The representative bank and accounting 
model is similar to the approach utilised by the BIS themselves in a study (King, 2010) 
conducted on Basel III and banks’ lending spreads in 2010. 
Creating a representative bank within the South African context is feasible due to the 
high level of concentration in the banking industry. A few major banks dominate the 
sector and the largest five accounts for 91% of the total banking assets in South Africa 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2015:7). The representative bank approach allows 
for sensitivity analysis and an advantage of the approach is the ability to measure the 
effect of different responses to regulation on profitability. 
This study analyses a comprehensive view of the capital and liquidity changes under 
Basel III, and contributes to recent literature on the impact of the Basel III regulations, 
most of which has been performed by the BIS. It is for this reason that most of the cited 
documents in this study are BIS documents and only a few journal articles are used. 
The purpose of the results of this study is to establish the extent to which the South 
African banking sector should be concerned about the profitability impact of Basel III. It 
is important to note though, that the liquidity regulation under Basel III is not yet fully in 
place and therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions without assumptions and estimates. 
A comprehensive view of the capital and liquidity changes under Basel III is analysed 
within the context of South Africa. The study also uses triangulation in order to 
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strengthen the validity of the findings and create a deeper and wider understanding of 
the topic, ultimately providing a useful tool with which to measure regulatory impacts on 
the South African banking sector. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Bank Regulation 
The banking system is inherently unstable. According to a World Bank study there were 
112 systemic banking crises, in 93 countries between the late 1970s and the end of the 
twentieth century (Caprio & Klingebiel, 1997). Banks are vulnerable as their liabilities 
(such as demand deposits) are typically short term and can be withdrawn at any time, 
while their assets (such as mortgages and business loans) are long term and normally 
illiquid in nature. The mere prospect of insolvency and the susceptibility to market 
rumours also leaves banks vulnerable to contagion effects.  
Banks play a pivotal function in the economy. Problems within the banking sector affect 
the financial system and the economy more severely than problems in most other 
sectors. The high degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions and the 
system-wide consequences that result from a failure of a bank is what distinguishes it 
from the failure of a non-financial firm (Crockett, 1996). A fitting example of this is the 
Global Financial Crisis discussed later in this section.  
The final report of the National Commission on the causes of the financial and economic 
crisis in the United Sates published in 2011, states that the financial crisis “was not a 
single event but a series of crises that rippled through the financial system.” An ever-
present debate surrounds the fact that a regulated industry (as opposed to a non-
regulated or less regulated industry) has in the recent past experienced collapses. To 
reduce the likelihood or even avoid a banking crisis, bank regulation is fundamental. 
Crisis prevention however, is not the sole factor for bank regulation, as a number of 
further reasons exist. Firstly bank regulation is integral in terms of customer protection; 
secondly to protect the public against criminal activity (fraud, money laundering and tax 
evasion); and thirdly for the safe provision of goods and services that are important for 
a society or economy. 
As economic externalities can render the banking system vulnerable, bank regulators 
must monitor risks at the macro level as well. Examples of such macro prudential 
regulation pertain to capital requirements and liquidity requirements.  
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Lind (2005:25) emphasises three factors that form the rationale for regulating banks; (1) 
certain banking activities are intrinsically vulnerable, (2) due to contagion, even minor 
disturbances can threaten overall financial stability and (3) with respect to key services, 
banks are the dominant providers. According to Schooner and Taylor (2010), the 
existence of information asymmetries provides further rationale for bank regulation. In 
this case, regulation is justified due to failure in the market for consistent and timely 
information. 
Adequate regulation of banks is critical to the economic health of countries and 
international markets. Banking regulation should not be complex and regulatory capital 
should be appropriately aligned to the risks banks face (Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 
2008:1). 
Banking regulation historically has experienced both waves of deregulation and 
regulation with tighter policies following periods of crises (Balthazar, 2006:5). In recent 
decades a notable trend has been the growing importance of capital adequacy 
standards as a measure of banks’ soundness. According to Dupuis (2006:1), adequate 
capital reserves serve an important function in protecting banks against losses. These 
capital reserves can absorb temporary losses allowing a bank to remain solvent until 
profitability is restored. Schooner and Taylor (2010) argue that capital regulation 
attempts to “correct the market failure resulting from banks” preference for a higher 
debt/equity ratio than is socially optimal.” Each jurisdiction however had different rules 
in relation to capital requirements. In an effort to create a common regulatory standard 
as well as a response to the growing instability within the banking industry during the 
1980’s, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) developed a framework known as 
the Basel Accords.  
2.2 Basel Accords 
The Basel Accords have been both influential and instrumental in centralising banking 
regulation, supervision and capital adequacy standards. The BIS Committee on Banking 
Supervision administers the current framework of minimum bank capital regulation. 
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2.2.1 Basel I 
The 1988 Basel Accord brought about a convergence in international bank capital 
regulation. According to Jackson (1999:1), the adoption of a standard framework in 
1988 by the Basel Committee intended to improve the soundness of the international 
banking system by increasing capital holdings, and to reduce competitive inequalities 
between internationally active banks in different countries. 
The 1988 Accord (Basel I) explicitly considered only credit risk. It required banks to hold 
a minimum total capital equal to risk-adjusted assets of 8% and at least 4% of Tier 1 
(core) capital. The Accord split capital into two classes based on its quality: Tier 1 and 
Tier 2. Tier 1 consists mainly of equity and Tier 2 consists mainly of debt instruments 
and the Accord specified that Tier 2 capital could not exceed Tier 1 capital. To determine 
risk-weighted assets for credit risk, exposure on a bank's balance sheet is assigned a 
given risk weight ranging from 0 to 100 percent. 
𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐥 𝟏 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨 = 
𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟏 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 + 𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟐 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥
𝐑𝐢𝐬𝐤 𝐰𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬
 ≥ 8% 
It is important to note that Basel I was created to enhance regulation only within the 
member states of the Basel Committee (a group of 11 nations). The agreement states 
that it is not intended for emerging market economies due to the unique risks in these 
economies. The fact that it was not intended for emerging markets created a number of 
known and unforeseen drawbacks. Balin (2008:6) discussed a few consequences of 
Basel I. “Short-run non-OECD bank debt is risk-weighted at a lower relative riskiness 
than long-term debt and therefore Basel I has encouraged international investors to 
move from holding long-run emerging market bank debt to holding short-run developing 
market instruments. This has amplified the risk of “hot money” in emerging markets and 
has created more volatile emerging market currency fluctuations.” Balin also cautioned 
that the lack of deep and liquid capital markets in emerging market economies make 
capital adequacy ratios less reliable. The absent effects on emerging markets together 
with the limited scope of the Accord to ensure international financial stability were 
significant criticisms of Basel I. Many agreed that the “one-size-fits-all” Basel I system 
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was too simple and led to inefficient uses of capital. Furthermore, Basel I did not 
consider the large array of risks present in the banking industry. A major shortcoming 
was the small selection of risk weights and its inability to differentiate levels of credit risk 
within the same asset class. An example of this was the creditworthiness of well-
established, profitable, listed companies as opposed to small start-ups. 
Basel I did not consider operational risk; defined later in the Basel II Accord as the “risk 
of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or 
from external events.” Operational risks have been ever-present in banking but only 
received suitable recognition under Basel II. As banking progressed, became more 
complex and banks began moving into non-traditional products, operational risk 
increased albeit not dealt with under Basel I. Eubanks (2006:9) discusses how 
operational risk was a major cause of bank failures but not taken into account in Basel 
I. He reiterates this by highlighting that fraud contributed to eight of the 11 U.S. bank
failures in 2002 and was also the direct cause of failure in several other cases. 
Another argument against Basel I was that it permitted regulatory arbitrage. Jones 
(2000:36) points out how banks attempted to deal with regulatory capital restrictions 
such as those imposed by Basel I. “Cosmetic adjustment exploits shortcomings in the 
measures of total risk appearing in the denominators of Basel 1 regulatory capital 
ratios.” For example, securitization provided opportunities for banks to reduce their 
regulatory measures of risk, with little or no corresponding reduction in their overall 
economic risks - a process termed ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’ (RCA). Jones (2000:51) 
stressed the importance of seeking ways to more closely align regulatory measures of 
risk with banks’ true economic risks. 
2.2.2 Basel II 
A full version of Basel II was published in 2006 primarily as a response to criticisms of 
Basel I and the evolution of banking worldwide. In contrast to Basel I, Basel II was 
founded on three pillars with each pillar focusing on a particular segment of the banking 
system. Pillar one deals with minimum capital requirements associated with credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk. This aligned the minimum capital requirements more 
closely to banks’ actual underlying risks. Pillar two deals with supervisory review and 
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ensures that banks develop sound risk management practices. This allowed supervisors 
to assess the reasonableness of banks’ assessments of their own risks. Pillar three 
establishes core disclosure by banks in order to improve market discipline. This third 
pillar thus encouraged prudent management and provided a mechanism whereby the 
market could reward well managed banks and penalise poorly managed banks. 
𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐥 𝟐 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨 = 
𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟏 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 + 𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟐 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 + 𝐓𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝟑 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥
𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤 + 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤 + 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤
> 8%
Post the introduction of Basel I, there had been significant developments both in the 
practice of measuring risks and in the financial instruments banks utilised to mitigate 
risks. A closer relationship between the risk and the capital required became necessary 
and Basel II provided this. Overall Basel II was a far more comprehensive approach to 
regulating bank capital than the “one-pillar” approach adopted in Basel I. 
Pillar 1 
As mentioned above, Pillar 1 set about the minimum capital requirements, based on the 
Basel 1 capital ratio, for credit, operational and market risk. Other risks were not 
considered. To evaluate each risk category, Basel II proposed the following options:  
Credit Risk Market Risk Operational Risk 
Standardised approach Standardised approach Basic indicator approach 
Internal rating approach 
(IRB) 
Internal Value at Risk 
(VAR) model approach Standardised approach 





Table 2.1: Basel II, Pillar 1 evaluation methods. Source: BIS, Basel II (2006). 




The second aspect of the framework provided recommendations for supervisory review 
and internal controls. Pillar 2 requires regulators to ensure that the capital requirements 
of Pillar 1 are adhered to. Furthermore regulators are expected to evaluate the 
appropriateness of banks internal controls. 
Pillar 3 
Pillar 3 developed disclosure requirements to enhance transparency. Banks are 
expected to disclose information around their internal risk management systems as well 
as information regarding how Basel II is being implemented.  
Danila (2012:131) noted that Basel II was an important step forward in risk sensitive 
capital regulation. According to him it created clear and strong links between calculation 
rules for capital adequacy standards, market supervision and market discipline. Despite 
this, Danila (2012:131) concludes that Basel II was not able to strengthen the banking 
system enough in order for it to respond to the challenges of the financial crisis. Rather 
the financial crisis highlighted the shortcomings of Basel II - the “lack of macro variables, 
procyclicality, liquidity risk improperly addressed and trading book related issues. 
Excessive reliance on external ratings and incorrect internal rating models also allowed 
for artificial reduction of capital requirements and decrease of banks’ capacity to 
withstand systemic crises.” As with the case with the first accord, Basel II revealed 
several negative impacts upon implementation and exposed certain limitations. Below I 
have discussed some of the major shortcomings of Basel II. 
It is widely accepted that banking is a procyclical industry (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 
2001:11; Enria et al., 2004). Specifically during downturns, banks limit credit supply 
which intensifies the downturn. Procyclicality can be explained as an underestimation 
or overestimation of risks which leads to high growth in upturns and risk aversion during 
downturns. A substantial amount of literature has addressed the procyclicality effects of 
the Basel Accords and general capital requirements. Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) 
found evidence of procyclicality in the Basel II capital requirements, resulting in a 
destabilising impact on the banking system. Kashyap and Stein (2004), Jokipii and Milne 
(2008) and Enria et al. (2004) found that capital requirements may lead to procyclical 
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behaviour, reducing the supply of loans by banks particularly in times of recession. 
Basel I and II has therefore been criticised for contributing to procyclicality within the 
banking sector instead of controlling it.  
The procyclicality of credit ratings has also been addressed by various pieces of 
literature and Basel II criticised for too much emphasis on external ratings. The ‘standard 
approach’ to credit risk differentiates assets according to riskiness provided by an 
external credit risk agency’s assessment. Bangia et al. (2002) highlighted the 
procyclicality of credit quality changes by showing that estimated credit losses were 
much higher in a contraction relative to an expansion. Altman and Saunders (2001) 
demonstrated that external ratings and hence the standardised approach component of 
Basel II would likely be procyclical. Danielsson et al. (2001:12) suggested that credit 
ratings may not be a convincing reflection of risk. Furthermore the use and dependence 
on external ratings created a conflict-of-interest situation for rating agencies. Rating 
analyses generated high fees for the ratings agencies from banks who wanted 
favourable ratings. Banks were able to either pressurise or shop around for favourable 
ratings for their instruments. Atik (2011:751) highlighted this fact and mentioned that 
high ratings benefit both the asset issuers and purchasers. Issuers wanted high ratings 
to increase the asset sale prices and marketability while purchase’s, like banks, wanted 
high ratings in order to hold less capital under Basel II. 
By the end of 2008, the G-10 agreed on the importance of the need to address the 
procyclicality issue in financial markets regulations and supervisory systems. They 
called upon the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to find ways to alleviate 
procyclicality. 
Another shortcoming of Basel II worth noting was the use of the Value-At-Risk (VAR) 
models. Danielsson et al. (2001:4) asserts that “VAR is a misleading risk measure when 
the returns are not normally distributed, as is the case with credit, market and in 
particular operation risk. Moreover it does not measure the distribution or extent of risk 
in the tail, but only provides an estimate of a particular point in the distribution. Existing 
VaR models generate imprecise and widely fluctuating risk forecasts.” This is ignored 
in Basel 2.  
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A criticism held against Basel II was that that liquidity risk is not adequately addressed 
and could be considered an afterthought. Liquidity risk is named as a direct risk in Pillar 
2 of the Basel 2 framework. Danila (2012:131) highlights the fact that liquidity risk is 
improperly addressed by the Basel II framework on both the financing side and 
individual asset liquidity.  
Furthermore Basel 2, in a similar vein to Basel I, it was not designed for emerging 
markets. Give this, Balin (2008:13) discusses several possible adverse effects for 
emerging market economies. Balin mentions the pressures placed on emerging market 
regulators due to the costs and skills involved in implementing Basel II. He also 
discusses several drawbacks with regards to the use of external ratings. Those who can 
afford rating agencies are confronted with unfavourable ratings due to uncertainty in 
accounting practices and bank regulations. 
2.2.3 Global Financial Crisis 
The Global Financial Crisis coincided with the phase-in period of Basel II and raised 
serious questions around global regulatory and supervisory frameworks. With the failure 
of many banks and financial institutions, financial regulation and in particularly Basel II 
took some of the blame.  
Both Basel I and Basel II, as highlighted in the shortcomings above, were not 
comprehensive enough to prevent risks stemming from banks’ exposure to certain 
instruments such as securitizations. Furthermore the accords did not take into account 
the systematic risk present in the financial system. Many of the financial institutions that 
had to be bailed out with public funds in 2008 and 2009 in Europe and in the United 
States were Multinational Banks (Navaretti, et al., 2010:3). Dermirguc-Kunt, 
Detragiache and Merrouche (2013) importantly reported that many of the banks that 
were rescued (bailed out) as a result of the crisis, were in compliance with minimum 
capital requirements shortly before and during the crisis. However many banks as well 
as non-financial institutions were highly leveraged and did not hold sufficient liquidity 
buffers. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) stated that the regulated banking industry 
and the high leverage of banks was a major contributor to the financial crisis. 
14 
The global financial crisis developed from the subprime crisis, into the credit crisis, then 
into a financial crisis and finally became a global financial crisis (De Jager, 2014:101). 
The crisis is often described as the bursting of the housing market bubble in late 2007 
which through a sequence of events resulted in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2008. What started as a crisis in one sector of the US economy in 2007 blew up into a 
worldwide financial crisis by late 2008. This can be viewed as proof of the high degree 
of interconnectedness in the financial system stressed in section 2.1 of the literature 
review. The global financial system and its financial institutions essentially have no 
borders. The crisis exposed shortcomings in the management of market liquidity and 
banks’ funding, with significant consequences for system-wide financial stability (Gobat 
et al., 2014:3). 
Claessens and Kodres (2014:6) list a few common causes of the crisis as a credit boom; 
a rapid asset price appreciation in the housing market; the creation of new instruments 
whose returns rely on continued favourable economic conditions (e.g. structured credit 
products) and financial liberalisation and deregulation (or alternatively regulation which 
relied on banks internal risk management models).  
It is obvious that no one factor in isolation was the cause of the global financial crisis 
but as can be expected regulation received much of the criticism. A study by Caprio et 
al. (2008) showed that the main reason for the subprime crisis was a failure of regulators 
and supervisors in various countries. The turmoil in the financial markets caused by the 
crisis demonstrated that regulatory and governance systems often fail to promote sound 
banking (Reisen, 2008). As mentioned in section 2.1 of this literature review, bank 
regulation is fundamental to crisis prevention. The global financial crisis therefore 
encouraged a revamp of financial regulation and in particular a review of bank 
regulation. Calomiris (2009:15) stressed that the need for policy reform should include 
macro prudential regulation as well as the strengthening of capital and liquidity rules. 
Amongst other factors there were widespread calls for the banking sector to hold more 
capital against their risk weighted assets and increase liquidity reserves in order to 
better absorb losses. With this Basel III, a new accord encompassing a new set of 
capital adequacy and liquidity measures as well as the inclusion of macro-prudential 
measures, was born. 
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The BIS validates the strengthening of the new standards by expressing that one of the 
main reasons for the crisis was the banking sectors excessive leverage. This was 
accompanied by a gradual erosion of the level and quality of the capital base. 
Furthermore banks were holding insufficient liquidity buffers. The banking system 
therefore was not able to absorb the resulting systemic trading and credit losses. The 
crisis was further amplified by the interconnectedness of systemic institutions. 
Eventually the market lost confidence in the solvency and liquidity of many banking 
institutions (BIS, December 2010, revised June 2011:1). 
2.2.4 Basel III 
As discussed above, the global financial crisis raised serious question marks around 
Basel II and bank regulation. In response to the many issues raised, financial regulators 
enhanced and developed new rules and regulations. In December 2010, the BCBS 
approved the Basel III Accord, effective 2013. Basel III is a global regulatory standard 
on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk agreed upon by the 
members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The approach’s adopted by 
Basel I and II were almost completely firm-specific and microprudential. The new accord 
introduces a system wide approach at the macroprudential level with the introduction of 
new measures as well as improving many aspects of Basel II relating to capital 
requirements and risk coverage. Herve Hannovn, Deputy General Manager at BIS, 
highlights this as the fundamental change in Basel III in a speech on Basel III in 
November 2010. The changes from Basel II to Basel III can be split into 3 main 
categories; capital adequacy ratio, new liquidity measures and a macroprudential 
approach to banking regulation – this is summarised below. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
As stated earlier, Basel I implemented a risk-weighted capital requirement at eight 
percent, with total capital divided 50/50 between Tier 1 and Tier 2. Basel II more or less 
adopted the same measure. Basel III adopted several changes to the capital 
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requirement (the ratio itself), the definition of capital (the numerator) as well 
strengthening the risk coverage (the denominator). 
The total capital ratio remains 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA), however Basel III 
significantly increases the quality of capital (numerator of ratio). Under the previous 
accords, capital consisted of various subsectors and a complex set of minimum and 
maximum requirements. Basel III stresses the importance in the composition and quality 
of capital and thus breaks down Tier 1 capital into two categories: “Common Equity Tier 
(CET) 1” and “Additional Tier 1.” The new definition places a strict emphasis on CET1 
(includes common shares and retained earnings) which is viewed as a high quality 
capital base, specifically required during crises. Basel III introduces stricter 
requirements for determining Additional Tier 1 capital to ensure these instruments 
absorb losses on a going concern basis. Tier 2 capital continues to provide loss 
absorption on a “gone concern” basis and mostly consists of subordinated debt. It has 
however been reduced from three and a half percent in Basel II to two percent in Basel 
III. Tier 3 capital is completely eliminated under the new definition.
Basel III places a restriction on instruments that qualify as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and 
has also abolished the breakdown of Tier 2 capital into upper and lower tiers. CET1 
consists of; common shares issued by banks (that meet certain criteria), share premium, 
retained earnings, other comprehensive income, minority interests in the common 
shares of consolidated subsidiaries and certain regulatory adjustments. The following 
are deducted from CET1: goodwill and intangibles; any increase in equity capital 
resulting from a securitisation transaction; pension and deferred tax assets; cash flow 
hedge reserve that relates to the hedging of items that are not fair valued; bank’s 
investment in its own shares; and cumulative gains and losses to changes in own credit 
risk on fair valued financial liabilities. With respect to minority interest the net income of 
the third party minorities cannot be retained by the parent as common equity. Additional 
Tier 1 capital elements include: instruments meeting the criteria for inclusion in 
additional Tier 1 capital but not included in CET 1, share premium from the issue of 
instruments included in additional Tier 1 capital, instruments issued by consolidated 
subsidiaries and held by third parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in additional Tier 
1 capital but not included in CET 1 and regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation 
of additional Tier 1 Capital. Tier 2 capital is defined as: instruments that meet the criteria 
for inclusion in Tier 2 capital but not included in Tier 1 Capital, share premium from the 
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issue of instruments included in additional Tier 2 capital, instruments issued by 
consolidated subsidiaries and held by third parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in 
Tier 2 capital but not included in Tier 1 capital, certain loan loss provisions and 
regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 capital. 
With respect to the denominator of the capital ratio, Basel III improves the risk 
coverages. New rules as well as modifications to previous ones were made to determine 
capital charges. This is specifically intended to correct the underestimation of risks 
which contributed significantly to the financial crisis. There is a strong focus on 
counterparty credit risk (CCR) and the reliance on external credit ratings. Basel II 
provided two approaches to measuring credit risk; the standardised approach (reliant 
on external ratings) and the internal ratings based approach. Basel III makes changes 
to both of these approaches specifically in relation to securities financing transactions 
and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2012:3) summarise the new requirements 
pertaining to enhanced risk coverage consisting of the following: 
• A charge for mark-to-market CCR called credit valuation adjustment,
• An asset value correlation multiplier for exposures to unregulated and large financial
institutions,
• The strengthening of margining and collateral management requirements and more
conservative regulatory haircuts for securitisation collateral,
• A requirement to include stressed market data when calculating the probability of
default of highly leveraged counterparties,
• Identification and management of wrong way risk, and
• A two percent weight for exposures to central counterparties.
The Basel III Total Capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Capital) must be at least 8% of risk-
weighted assets at all times. CET1 increases from 2% to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets 
under Basel III. The Additional Tier 1 capital ratio is 1.5% therefore raising Tier 1 Capital 
from 4% to 6%. Basel III introduces a capital conservation buffer (that did not exist under 
Basel II) of 2.5% of Common Equity Tier I capital. This implies banks will need to 
maintain a minimum CET1 ratio of 7%. 
18 
The underlying rationale for the capital conservation buffer (and in fact the 
countercyclical buffer which is discussed later), is that banks increase capital during 
periods of strength and draw down when unexpected losses occur. Banks that do not 
meet the capital conservation buffer requirement are required to retain a percentage of 
dividend payments, share buy-backs, and staff bonus payments prior to regulatory 
deductions (Bank for international settlements, 2011a:54). 
Figure 2.1 below presents the minimum capital requirements under Basel II and Basel 
III (excluding the conservation and countercyclical capital buffers). 
Figure 2.1: Minimum capital requirements comparison between Basel II and Basel III. Source: 
Babic (2011:147). 
The capital ratio under Basel III therefore does not only increase the CET1 requirement 
but the improved definition of capital and enhanced risk coverage further enhances the 
effect of the changes. These ratios are to be phased in by January 2019. According to 
Delimatsis (2012:12) the new and enhanced capital buffers (especially to Tier 1) will 
mitigate the effect of procyclicality in the banking sector. 
Basel III provides a phase in period for the new capital requirements. The minimum CET 
1 and Tier 1 requirements came into effect between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015 
while the capital buffers will come into effect between 1 January 2016 and 1 January 
2019. Capital instruments that do not meet the new regulations but are currently being 
used are being phased out over a 10 year period beginning in 2013. 
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Liquidity Standards 
One of the more prominent additions introduced by Basel III were liquidity measures as 
a reactive stance to the global financial crisis. Financial Institutions are now required to 
maintain liquidity buffers, a new requirement not stipulated under Basel II. The Accord 
was revised in January 2013, with new provisions regarding the size, composition and 
availability of liquidity buffers. The Basel III liquidity framework proposes two liquidity 
ratios: The Leverage Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Nets Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). 
According to a study by Yan et al. (2011), the new liquidity regulations will lower the 
probability of future banking crises and associated losses of economic output. 
The LCR is designed to measure a bank’s resilience over a thirty day stress period 
where some classes of creditors suddenly withdraw from credit markets. The LCR is the 
ratio of the value of an institution’s stock of high-quality liquid assets to an estimated 
value of the total, net cash outflow from the institution, in a hypothetical stress scenario 
lasting 30 calendar days (Bank for International Settlements, 2010a). 
𝐋𝐂𝐑 = 
𝐒𝐭𝐨𝐜𝐤 𝐨𝐟 𝐡𝐢𝐠𝐡 𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐥𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐝 𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 (𝐇𝐐𝐋𝐀)
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐟𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐬 𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐧𝐞𝐱𝐭 𝟑𝟎 𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬
> 100%
This ratio is required to be above 100% and Basel III lists the assets that can be included 
in the numerator of the formula. These assets were initially divided into two groups, 
namely Level 1 and Level 2. The 2013 Accord amendment split Level 2 into Level 2A 
and 2B.  
Level 1 assets generally include cash, central bank reserves, and certain marketable 
securities backed by sovereigns and central banks, among others. These assets are 
generally considered the highest quality and the most liquid, and there is no limit on the 
extent to which a bank can hold these assets. Level 2A assets include, for example, 
certain government securities, covered bonds and corporate debt securities. Level 2B 
assets include lower rated corporate bonds, residential mortgage backed securities and 
equities that meet certain conditions (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Level 2 
assets may not exceed 40% of total HQLA and Level 2B assets may not exceed 15% 
of HQLA. 
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Total net cash outflows is defined as the sum of outflows over the next thirty days minus 
the lesser of contractual inflows and 75% of outflows. This also includes off-balance 
sheet outflows. The LCR therefore forces a firm to hold liquid assets equal to at least 
25% of its projected outflows (Hartlage, 2012:464). 
The NSFR standard was developed to promote medium and long-term funding stability. 
The NSFR is the ratio of available stable funding (ASF) to required stable funding (RSF): 
𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹 = 
𝐀𝐯𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐚𝐦𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐟𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 (𝐀𝐒𝐅)
𝐑𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐦𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐟𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 (𝐑𝐒𝐅)
 > 100%
𝐄𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝐋𝐢𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬 (> 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫) + 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐬 (< 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫)𝐗 𝟎. 𝟗% + 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐃𝐞𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐗 𝟎. 𝟖% + 𝐒𝐓 𝐃𝐞𝐛𝐭 𝐗 𝟎. 𝟓% 
𝐆𝐨𝐯 𝐃𝐞𝐛𝐭 𝐗 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓% + 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐩 𝐋𝐨𝐚𝐧𝐬 (< 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫)𝑿 𝟎. 𝟓% + 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔 (< 𝟏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓)𝑿 𝟎. 𝟖𝟓% + 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝑿 𝟎. 𝟔𝟓% + 𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑿 𝟏𝟎𝟎%
The NSFR promotes funding stability in limiting a banks reliance on short-term 
wholesale funding. Stable funding includes customer deposits, long-term debt and 
equity and excludes short-term wholesale funding. To comply with the NSFR, banks 
must have ASF greater than their RSF and therefore will pursue strategies either to 
increase their ASF or decrease their RSF. 
The NSFR definition uses the Basel III capital rules thereby inheriting some of the 
shortcomings of capital rules. As an example, the pro-cyclical impact of fair value 
changes of financial assets on Tier 1 capital can be transferred to the NSFR. This 
increases the pro-cyclicality of liquidity measures (Song, 2014:5). Distinguin et al. 
(2013) discovered that banks with lower NSFR ratios will also have lower regulatory 
capital ratios. Furthermore Dietrich et al. (2014) found that banks that have strong NSFR 
ratios also tend to have strong regulatory capital ratios. 
The premise supported by the liquidity regulation is that an increased holdings of high 
quality liquid assets should reduce banks risk (Allen and Gale, 2004:5), however these 
expected benefits would not be achieved if banks increased the riskiness of their other 
asset holdings (Wagner, 2007). 
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King (2013:4144) in his study on banks in the U.S, Japan and three emerging market 
countries finds that the most cost-effective strategy to abide by the NSFR is to hold 
more higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These 
changes will reduce net interest margins (NIM). 
According to Kowalik (2013:80) the new Basel III liquidity provisions are inflexible as 
they do not account for each institutions specific factors that determine their own ability 
to withstand a liquidity shock (e.g. the nature of an individual financial institution’s risk 
profile, capital, and business activity). This raises the possibility that some institutions 
may be required to hold larger or smaller buffers than is actually necessary given the 
nature of their operations. He also argues that an inflexible approach could lead to 
‘regulatory arbitrage’ as institutions may find strategies to exploit the loopholes in the 
Basel liquidity provisions. 
It is important to note that even though the Basel III measures are revolutionary in terms 
of centralising liquidity regulation, many countries regulators already impose some sort 
of liquid asset requirement. The Basel III LCR and NSFR are a lot more comprehensive 
though. Table 2.2 below presents the liquidity measures requirements over the official 
Basel phase in period to 2019. 




















Starts 100% 100% 
Table 2.2: Basel III liquidity ratios implementation timeline. Source: Standard Bank Group Risk 
Report (2013). 
As global liquidity measures are new, the Basel III LCR and NSFR are likely to have the 
biggest impact on banks or at the least be one of the main concerns for bankers. Dietrich 
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et al. (2014) in a study on 921 Western European banks found that the majority of banks 
have historically not met the NSFR minimum requirements between 1996 and 2010. 
Systemic risk-based approach (Macro-prudential) 
The global financial crisis illustrated the failure of Basel II to incorporate macroprudential 
measures in an inherently unstable banking system. Basel III sets about incorporating 
macroprudential regulation. According to Freixas et al. (2015:42) there exists an 
emerging consensus that macroprudential policies are required for financial stability and 
can curtail credit booms and excessive risk-taking by financial intermediaries 
Leverage Ratio 
Prior to and during the financial crisis many banks had adequate capital ratios but had 
built up excessive leverage. Excessive leverage by banks is viewed by many as one of 
the contributing factors to the global financial crisis (FSB, 2009:15). The Basel 
Committee therefore introduced the Leverage Ratio to supplement the minimum capital 
requirements. The ratio has been added by the BCBS in response to the criticism of the 
previous frameworks’ reliance on banks’ own internal models in setting capital 
requirements. The BIS (2011a:4) argues that the leverage ratio requirement will help 
contain the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking system, as occurred during 
the global financial crisis. The ratio will help with attempts to game the risk based 
requirements and also help address model risk. The proposed leverage ratio is 
calculated by comparing Tier 1 capital with total exposure (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011a:61). 




The leverage ratio is a measure of a bank’s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its assets 
(including off-balance sheet exposures). The requirement has been set at 3% and the 
appropriateness of this level and final adjustments to the definition will be assessed and 
finalised by 2017. The leverage ratio, along with public disclosure requirements, is 
applicable from 1 January 2015.  
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The BIS (2014:2) defines a bank’s total exposure (denominator) as: a) on-balance sheet 
exposures; b) derivative exposures; c) securities finance transactions (SFTs), including 
repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements and margin lending 
transactions; and d) off-balance sheet exposures, such as commitments, guarantees 
and standby letters of credit. 
Off-balance sheet exposures often are a source of significant leverage and therefore 
the BCBS has instructed banks to include them in the denominator of the leverage ratio. 
According to D’Hulster (2009:4) one of the leverage ratio’s benefits is its simplicity. He 
states that it can be adopted quickly, doesn’t have a huge cost implication and doesn’t 
require any significant expertise from banks or their supervisors. Furthermore, the 
leverage ratio can be applied regardless of the capital adequacy regime in a jurisdiction. 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
A second capital buffer, the countercyclical capital buffer, has been introduced by Basel 
III as a macro-economic approach in an attempt to diminish the effect of procyclicality. 
The buffer will range between 0% and 2.5% of CET1 and will be determined by the 
regulator in each jurisdiction. According to the BIS (2015:1), the countercyclical buffer 
aims to ensure that the banking sector capital requirements take account of the macro 
environment. See figure 2.2 below for an illustration. 
Figure 2.2: Relationship between the minimum CET1 requirement and buffers. Source: Juks and 
Melander (2012). 
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According to Juks and Melander (2012:8) this buffer targets systematic risks that 
traditional microprudential regulation could not detect. They highlight the fact that this 
buffer on a macro basis deals with risks present in the entire financial system. The 
proposal for the buffer (before it was incorporated in the Basel III document) by the 
Basel Committee in July 2010 was justified to achieve the macro-prudential goal of 
protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth that have often being 
associated with the build-up of systemic-wide risk. 
The buffer will be phased in together with the capital conservation buffer between 1 
January 2016 and the end of 2018. It will become fully effective on 1 January 2019. 
2.3 South Africa Banking Regulation 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB), established in 1921, is the central bank of 
South Africa and is responsible for banking regulation. The SARB is also responsible 
for upholding the effective application of international regulatory and supervisory 
standards. The SARB monitors bank activities in terms of either the Banks Act, 1990, 
or the Mutual Banks Act, 1993. Other than the SARB, regulators involved in banking 
supervision in South Africa include the Financial Services Board (FSB), the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the National Credit Regulator (NCR). Each of these 
authorities are governed by Acts. 
Prior to the 1980’s, South Africa’s bank capital requirements were based on simple 
ratios of capital to total assets and off-balance sheet activities and derivatives were 
unregulated. The implementation of the Banking Act of 1990, based on Basel rules, was 
the important step in manoeuvring South African bank regulation in accordance with 
international standards. 
South Africa is now widely considered to have an advanced and sound banking system. 
A report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published in October 2008 observes 
that South Africa has a well-diversified and refined financial system that is supported by 
an effective regulatory framework as well as a developed financial and legal 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the World Economic Forum rated South African banks 
second in the world for soundness in 2012 (World Economic Forum, 2012). 
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It is noteworthy that South Africa was not severely affected by the global financial crisis. 
The SARB was not forced to alter its monetary operations following the onset of the 
crisis as was not the case for many other central banks globally. South Africa’s domestic 
money market rates hardly changed at the time when Libor rates increased significantly. 
Overall, the local interbank market functioned effectively. Furthermore South African 
banks’ leverage was rather low in comparison to other jurisdictions (SARB, 2009:4). 
According to the SARB (2007:4) one of the main reasons South African commercial 
banks were not severely affected was due to the fact that they had no direct exposure 
to the sub-prime mortgage market. Due to the aforementioned facts no changes to 
regulation in South African were prescribed other than those by the Basel Capital Accord 
post the financial crisis.  
South Africa belongs to the G-20 group of countries and is a member of the Basel 
Committee. The SARB actively participate in Basel Accords and compliance. Banking 
Regulation in South Africa has recently been amended to accommodate Basel III. The 
implementation of the Basel III framework is being phased in, having commenced on 1 
January 2013 and will following the timelines determined by the Basel 
Committee. Figure 2.3 below extracted from Nedbank’s Risk Report details the 
minimum capital requirements for South Africa on the Basel phase in timetable. 
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Figure 2.3: South African Basel minimum requirements. Source: Nedbank Group Limited Risk 
Report (2012). 
According to De Jager (2015:59) current bank regulation in South Africa is comparable 
with developed nations that subscribe to the Basel Accords. A 2015 IMF published 
report found that South Africa has a high level of compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The report noted that the SARB had made 
significant improvements since the last assessment five years prior. In relation to the 
Basel Principles, South Africa was found to be compliant with Principle 24 on liquidity 
risk (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). 
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In May 2012, the SARB released Guidance Note G5/2012 approving the provision of a 
committed liquidity facility (CLF) that will assist banks in meeting the LCR in terms of 
Basel III. While designing the LCR rules, it was evident that certain jurisdictions do not 
have sufficient HQLA for their banking system to meet this new requirement. In these 
jurisdictions (South Africa as an example), the regulation allows the central bank the 
option of providing contractual committed liquidity facilities that contribute toward a 
bank’s stock of liquid assets (Bank for International Settlements, 2013:22). The facility 
is capped at 40% of any particular bank’s net outflows under stressed scenarios. The 
SARB has adopted the use of the CLF as a substitute for Level 2A assets and has 
issued various guidance notes and other documents on the matter. The CLF is available 
to all banks from 1 January 2013 (SARB, 2012:19). South Africa’s use of the CLF makes 
it difficult to draw extensive conclusions from previous research on the important liquidity 
components of Basel III. 
While the Basel III liquidity ratios are new, liquidity regulation imposed by the SARB is 
not. South African banks have been subject to national liquidity requirements prior to 
the introduction of the LCR and NSFR. The national liquidity measure is known as the 
liquid asset requirement and is disclosed on a monthly basis. The new Basel III LCR 
became legally binding for all South African banks in 2015 and will follow the official 
phase in period presented in Table 2.2. 
The South African banking sector is characterised by high concentration. The largest 
five banks constitute 91% of the total banking assets in South Africa (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2015:7). As at the end of December 2014, there were 31 
banking institutions reporting data to the SARB. The South African banking system had 
total assets of ZAR 4,178,699 million, or 107.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
2.3.1 Risk reports of the big five South African banks 
Of all the significant changes under Basel III (summarised in 2.2.4 above), this study on 
the South African banking sector focuses on the tighter capital requirements and more 
importantly, the impact of the new liquidity ratios. The reason for the importance of the 
liquidity measures over the capital measures stems from the fact that from a South 
African perspective, the major banks and the banking sector in general are well 
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capitalised. This was also one of the factors which assisted the South African banking 
industry from the global financial crisis. 
Table 2.3 and 2.4 below details the Tier 1 and Total capital ratios of South Africa’s top 
5 banks obtained from their respective risk and annual reports. The tables highlight the 
healthy capital position of the major South African banks (Also illustrated in Figure 2.4). 
2012 (BASEL II) 







Group 11.70% 14.60% 789 613 
Standard Bank SA 11.30% 14.80% 499 819 
FirstRand 1 13.20% 14.70% 471 468 
FirstRand Bank 12.60% 14.60% 364 435 
Barclays Africa 
Group 14.00% 17.50% 438 216 
ABSA Bank 
Limited 13.70% 17.50% 385 855 
Nedbank Group 12.90% 14.90% 359 658 
Nedbank Limited 12.90% 15.30% 313 638 
Investec Limited 2 11.60% 16.10% 192 376 
Investec Bank 
Limited 11.40% 16.10% 184 253 
1 FirstRand year end of June 2012 
2 Investec year end of March 2012 
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Table 2.3: South African banks capital ratios 2012 (Basel II). Source: Company’s Annual Reports 
and Risk Reports (2012). 
2013 (BASEL II) 
Total Tier 1 






Group 13.20% 12.60%  16.20% 841 272 
Standard Bank SA 12.80% 12.80% 16.50% 489 045 
FirstRand 1 14.80% 13.70% 16.20% 535 410 
FirstRand Bank 13.30% 12.60% 14.90% 403 464 
Barclays Africa 
Group 13.00% 11.90% 15.60% 560 865 
ABSA Bank Limited 12.00% 11.00% 15.60% 405 942 
Nedbank Group 13.60% 12.50% 15.70% 392 926 
Nedbank Limited 12.10% 10.70% 14.50% 336 858 
Investec Limited 2 10.80% 8.90% 15.50% 223 865 
Investec Bank 
Limited 10.90% 10.30% 16.20% 217 715 
1 FirstRand year end of June 2013 
2 Investec year end of March 2013 
Table 2.4: South African banks capital ratios 2013 (Basel III) 
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Figure 2.4: Major South African banks’ capital ratios. Source: Company’s Annual Reports and 
Risk Reports (2013). 
The graph above of the five South African banks’ total capital adequacy ratio further 
illustrates the extent to which all are operating above the minimum Basel requirements. 
It displays the total capital adequacy ratio at 2012 under Basel II and then at 2013 under 
Basel III. The increased capital requirements under Basel IIII have hardly impacted the 
capital ratios of South Africa’s major banks. It is also interesting to note that three 
(Standard Bank, FirstRand Bank and Investec) of the five banks experienced an 
increase in their capital ratios in 2013 after the adoption of Basel III. 
The SARB annual report for 2012 confirms that the banking sector was adequately 
capitalised throughout 2012. Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and Tier 1 CAR 
increased from 15.1% and 12.2% respectively as at 31 December 2011 to 15.9% and 
12.6% respectively as at 31 December 2012. These figures were based on the Basel II 
framework (SARB 2012:46). The advent of Basel III on 1 January 2013 and the changes 
to the capital ratios did not adversely affect this situation. At the end of December 2013, 
the banking sector was still well capitalised at 15.6% despite the implementation of 
higher capital requirements under Basel III (SARB, 2013:1). This clearly indicates that 
the capital adequacy of the South African banking sector as a whole was well above the 
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The BIS issued an update report on the Basel Committee member jurisdictions and 
bank’s progress in meeting the Basel III measures in 2014. They state that in the second 
half of 2013, the average CET1 ratio of large international banks was 10.2% (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2014:5). As Table 2.4 above illustrates all of the five major 
South African banks had a CET1 ratio above the international average quoted by the 
BCBS, during the same period. Nedbank incurred the lowest CET1 ratio of the five 
banks with 10.7% still 0.5% above the average for international banks. This is further 
testament to the healthy capital position of the South African banking sector. 
As the South African banking sector continues along the official Basel III implementation 
timeline, minimum required capital ratios will rise through to 2019. The additional capital 
buffers (capital conservation and countercyclical buffers) will also be phased in from 
2016. Despite the strong capital position of the South African banking sector this rise in 
the minimum regulatory requirement will obviously present some pressures on their 
capital positions. The sector will need to prioritise capital planning taking into account 
the increasing requirements. 
2.4 Regulation and Bank Profitability 
A significant amount of literature exists which argues that there could be significant costs 
associated with higher capital requirements. Calem and Rob (1999) suggest that 
increased capital regulation may result in excessive risk-taking behaviour by 
undercapitalised banks that in turn have unintended negative consequences on banks. 
Santos (2000) makes the argument that bank regulation, through higher capital 
requirements, negatively affects bank development and credit expansion by increasing 
fixed costs and operating costs. Claessens and Klingebiel (2000) present an argument 
for less bank regulation and suggest that fewer regulatory restrictions permits banks to 
efficiently utilize economies of scale and scope. A McKinsey (2010) study estimates that 
the ROE for the average bank will decrease by about 4% in Europe and about 3% in 
the United States (US) as a result of the implementation of Basel III. 
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Contrary to the above, some studies suggest that banks with high levels of capital 
perform better than undercapitalised banks. Abreu and Mendes (2001) suggest a 
positive impact of equity level on profitability. Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) 
also supports the finding of a positive relationship between capital/asset ratio and bank’s 
earnings.  
Finally a third view exists that bases a hypothesis on Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) 1958 
Irrelevance theory. According to MM (1958) theory, capital structure is irrelevant and 
therefore an increase in equity should have no effect on the value of a bank. Admati et 
al. (2013) set about highlighting why arguments that banks face increased costs with 
increased equity requirements is flawed. They argue that forcing banks to hold higher 
equity on their balance sheets is not socially expensive. Overall though, the literature 
on capital and bank profitability (with specific focus on Basel standards) suggests that 
the MM (1958) irrelevance position does not hold.  
Liquidity was also an important factor during the global financial crisis as banks ran short 
of cash. This led to the liquidity measures introduced under Basel III. The relationship 
between liquidity and profitability is also a debatable topic much like capital and 
profitability. Theoretically speaking and assuming all else held equal, the LCR should 
reduce banks liquidity risk by increasing high quality liquid asset holdings or reducing 
outflows from the liability side. This should reduce banks profitability by holding more 
low yielding assets. Consistent with this notion is a study conducted on a sample of U.S. 
and Canadian banks by Bordeleau and Graham (2010) that finds that beyond a certain 
point, liquid assets reduce bank profitability. Angbazo (1997) find an increase in liquid 
assets reduces net interest margins of banks as a result of a lower liquidity risk premium. 
Molyneux and Thorton (1992) found a significant inverse relationship between liquidity 
and profitability. Similarly Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) found a negative 
relationship in a study on European banks. Furthermore King (2013:41444) found that 
in order for banks to meet the NSFR they have to hold more higher-rated securities and 
expand the maturity of wholesale funding which in turn reduces net interest margins. 
Contrary to the above, Bourke (1989) in his study on European, North American and 
Australian banks found a positive relationship between liquid assets and bank 
profitability. This contradicts the generally accepted notion that low yielding liquid assets 
reduce profitability. In a slightly different outcome to both the above mentioned strands 
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of research on liquidity, Giordana and Schumacher (2012) find that the LCR has an 
insignificant impact on banks’ profitability. The study was performed on Luxembourg 
banks. 
2.5 Problem Statement 
The changes to Basel III, specifically around tighter capital requirements and the new 
liquidity measures, are likely to impact banks’ profitability. A substantial body of literature 
examining the impact of bank regulation does exist, but few studies model the impact 
of the Basel III capital and liquidity requirements on banks’ profitability. The BIS 
themselves have conducted most of the Basel III analyses. Two examples are; An 
assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity 
requirements (Bank for International Settlements, 2010), and Mapping capital and 
liquidity requirements to bank lending spreads (King, 2010). In addition, several recent 
studies on the impact of Basel III measured the impact on lending rates while holding 
ROE constant or targeting a specific ROE. King (2010:2) mentions that to keep ROE 
unchanged, banks raise lending rates and this has been the focus of much recent 
literature. The BIS (2010b), Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010), Angelini, et al. (2011), 
and Slovik and Cournède (2011) have all contributed to literature on the impact of Basel 
III on lending spreads. 
A second strand of recent literature on the impact of Basel III assesses macroeconomic 
factors, such as the impact on GDP. Vitek and Rodger (2012) measure the effect on 
various macroeconomic factors, such as GDP as a result of higher capital requirements. 
Their study was based on fifteen mostly advanced economies. De-Ramon, et al. (2012) 
use a model to estimate the total impact of Basel III on United Kingdom’s (UK) GDP. 
In the closest match to the research in this study, McKinsey & Company suggests that 
Basel III would reduce ROE for an average European bank by 4%, and 3% for an 
American one. The ROE decrease is expected to be gradual with the respective 4% and 
3% declines expected in 2019 after the full Basel III phase in. The McKinsey study 
analysed 45 European banks along with the largest US banks and states that the fall in 
ROE mainly comes from the capital and funding impact. These two areas of Basel III 
are also primarily focused on by this study. 
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Conceptually speaking, an increase in capital requirement under Basel III should reduce 
ROE if banks do not adjust their behaviour. Furthermore, the liquidity ratios force banks 
to hold shorter term, lower yielding assets which, theoretically speaking, suggests that 
ROA should decrease. Furthermore, holding more high quality liquid assets should 
lower interest income and funding assets with longer maturity liabilities (required by 
NSFR) will increase interest expense. This should therefore result in net interest 
margins (NIM) declining. 
Ultimately, the new capital and liquidity measures introduced under Basel III are 
expected to negatively affect bank profitability. Many industry experts, as well as the 
banks themselves (prior to 2013), have commented on the potentially significant impact 
on profitability by the new Basel III. The BIS mention that banks’ adjustment to meet the 
higher capital and liquidity requirements will impact profitability and specifically NIM 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2016:28). Due to the relatively recent 
implementation of Basel III, very little research on actually measuring the effect on 
profitability of the banking sector has been conducted. Almost no research has been 
performed on the effect of Basel III on the profitability of the South African banking 
sector. This was established through an extensive search of online journals, Google 
Scholar and UCT library resources for Basel research on South Africa. Dr De Jager 
(Associate Professor at UCT) was also consulted on the matter. From a South African 
perspective, The Banking Association of South Africa (2016) developed a model to 
compute the Basel regulatory costs and demonstrate the changing cost structures due 
to the Basel Accords. The model displays a quantitative cost impact of regulation on 
certain asset products. The Banking Association of South Africa’s model does not 
measure profitability of the banking sector and does not answer any pertinent questions 
around the profitability impact and banks’ possible reaction to Basel III. This highlights 
the need for this particular study on the profitability impact of Basel III in South Africa. 
Lastly, the BCBS, as at March 2016, also states that the only empirical studies 
performed on the Basel III liquidity regulation are based on the UK and Netherlands 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2016:32). 
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2.6 Research Question 
The primary research question that this study aims to address is: 
 What is the impact of the change from Basel II to Basel III on the profitability of
the South African banking sector, assuming banks’ product pricing remains
unchanged?
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3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.1 Introduction 
Using the current literature and previous bodies of research around the topic, this 
section articulates the overall research approach that answers the research question. 
The major South African banks used in the study are discussed, along with an analytical 
model generated based on bank profitability. The section also describes the data-
collection process and the data analysis. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research is exploratory in nature, using a combination of literature and analytical 
modelling. It builds on the research findings from related studies, as well as publicly 
available information on banks as detailed in the literature review. The overall research 
design for this study is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.1: Overall research design 
The study entails an analysis of bank data and information to determine the impact of 
the change from Basel II to Basel III on bank profitability. The approach adopted in this 
study is based on the method utilised by the BIS themselves in the King (2010) 
assessment on Basel III and lending rates. King (2010) adopted a methodology of 
creating a representative bank and then using accounting relationships. The same 
approach is used in this study. 
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The study uses triangulation by combining qualitative and various quantitative research 
methods in order to strengthen the validity of the findings and create a deeper 
understanding of the topic. As depicted in Figure 3.1, four sources of information have 
been used in order to provide confirmation and completeness, thereby reducing bias. 
Overall literature is used to formulate a model to address the topic and then the model 
output is compared to three different sources of information. 
Firstly, a summary of each individual bank’s expectation of the impact of the change 
from Basel II to Basel III is collated from their 2012 annual reports. Secondly, the 
collected data is used to generate an analytical model by creating a representative bank 
of the South African banking industry. Then, using an accounting approach the study 
measures the impact of the change from Basel II to Basel III on profitability, after which 
the banks’ expectations and the modelled profitability are compared to the actual 
profitability of the generated representative bank for 2013 and 2014. Lastly, market 
performance data obtained from Bloomberg for the JSE Banking Index is used to 
corroborate the findings from the modelled profitability due to the Basel changes and 
the actual profitability of the representative bank. The constituents of the JSE Banking 
Index are Standard Bank, ABSA, FirstRand Bank, Nedbank and Capitec Bank. It 
therefore contains four of the five banks used in this study and is an appropriate 
representation of the market performance of the representative bank. According to the 
European Central Bank (2010:10), one of the most common market-based measures is 
the price-to-earnings ratio (PE ratio). The PE ratio of the JSE Banking Index is therefore 
used to compare against the findings of the modelled profitability and actual profitability 
findings of the representative bank. 
Two crucial aspects of the new regulatory framework are tighter capital requirements 
and new liquidity measures and the study thus concentrates on these areas. It is 
commonly understood that tighter capital and liquidity requirements can affect banks’ 
behaviour (e.g. changing lending rates), and this has been assessed by many current 
studies, like King (2010), Slovik and Cournède (2011) and Swamy (2014). In so doing, 
they have either held ROE constant or targeted a specific ROE figure. A significant 
underlying assumption for this study, however, is that banks’ behaviour is held constant 
while the effect on profitability is assessed. 
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3.3 Data Description 
The area of focus for this study is the South African banking industry. The 31 December 
2012 date is critical to the study as it marks the changeover to the latest Basel Accord. 
On this date, Basel II was replaced with Basel III. South Africa implemented Basel III on 
1 January 2013. The study analyses the five largest banks in South Africa (according to 





 Investec Bank Limited
These banks hold the majority of the South African banking assets. As at 31 December 
2012 (the Basel changeover date), 91.1% of total banking assets were held by these 
five banks (SARB, 2012:38), as Figure 3.2 illustrates. These five are therefore deemed 
an adequate representation of the South African banking industry. 






The following information was collected pertaining to the five banks as at 31 December 
2012 (Basel II) and 31 December 2013 (Basel III): 
 Net income, average total assets, risk weighted assets, average total equity and
breakdown of equity.
 Basel ratios (capital, liquidity and leverage ratios).
 Assets and liabilities maturity analysis (where available).
Secondary data was collected from the five banks’ annual reports and interim reports 
for the quantitative aspect of the study. Data pertaining to bank profitability as well as 
the actual Basel ratios is sourced from the various banks’ annual reports. Three of the 
banks have December year-ends (Standard Bank, ABSA and Nedbank), while 
FirstRand has a June year-end and Investec a March year-end. The six-month 
unaudited interim data for 31 December 2012 (under Basel II) and 31 December 2013 
onwards (Basel III) was used for FirstRand. For Investec, the six-month interim figures 
as at September were used in the model. Net income, total assets and total equity 
figures and the Basel ratios were obtained from the banks’ annual and interim reports. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Literature as well as banks’ disclosure of their Basel III ratios (from their annual reports) 
was discussed towards the end of Section 2. A summary of South Africa’s five largest 
banks’ Basel III and profitability ratios has also been detailed. This forms the underlying 
basis for the analytical model generated. The data collected and captured is presented 
in the form of a base model that represents banks’ profitability as at 31 December 2012 
– the changeover point from Basel II to Basel III. The individual five banks information
is summed together as a representation of the South African banking industry. Various 
pieces of literature demonstrate that bank profitability is measured by return on equity 
(Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004), return on assets or net interest margins 
(Flamini, McDonald & Schumacher, 2009). 
The individual banks’ 2012 annual report assessment of their expected Basel III impact 
is summarised in Section 4.1. The banks’ expectation of the change in profitability from 
Basel II to Basel III is highlighted before analysing the generated model, as well as the 
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actual profitability figures in 2013 and 2014. Finally, market performance data is then 
analysed in support of the modelled profitability and actual profitability of the South 
African representative bank. 
It is noted that it is now possible to analyse the actual profitability figures post Basel III 
implementation and scrutinise the impact of the changes. However, bank profitability is 
sensitive to a multitude of microeconomic and macroeconomic factors and hence it is 
difficult to isolate the specific effect of just the Basel changes. Therefore, the generated 
analytical model of the South African bank industry is used to measure the impact of the 
capital and liquidity changes in Basel III. The model uses a DuPont system of financial 
analysis with ROE and ROA as output figures and a measure of profitability. DuPont is 
a widespread financial analysis system. It decomposes ROE into components that 
determine profit efficiency, asset efficiency and leverage. The DuPont ratio is a common 










To meet the increased capital demands of Basel III, banks can issue new equity, cut 
costs and thereby boost retained earnings or reduce risk-weighted assets. Reducing 
assets is unlikely to be pursued by banks due to the loss of revenue and comparative 
advantage over other banks and financial intermediaries. It stands without reason that 
obtaining new equity can be costly (probably the most costly in achieving Basel III’s 
increased capital requirements) and will negatively affect banks’ profitability. Findings 
by Cosimano and Hakura (2011) suggest that under Basel III the large banks would on 
average need to increase their equity-to-asset ratio by 1.3 percentage points. If banks 
increase equity to meet the new Basel III capital ratios they will do so without interfering 
with their balance sheet assets and liabilities. They could in fact purchase new assets 
with the money raised from increasing equity. 
Holding all else equal, the effect of an increase in capital on ROE (which will also 
increase the equity-to-asset ratio), is modelled using 2012 figures. This was the final 
year under Basel II in South Africa. The model allows for measuring what effect, for 
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example, a capital increase of 2% would have on the profitability of the South African 
banking sector. Section 2.3.1 highlights the strong capital position of the South African 
banking sector and illustrates how it has been operating well above the Basel III 
minimum requirements in 2013. Therefore, it is highly unlikely the South African banking 
sector would need to increase capital at all ahead of the initial Basel III changes in 2013 
and would probably only require a minor increase in capital in order to meet the 
increasing requirements through to 2019. A relatively small increase of 2% in capital 
was therefore considered appropriate to model the impact of the capital change. 
The model uses ROA and net interest margins (NIM) to measure the impact of the Basel 
III liquidity measures. ROA is a common bank profitability indicator and used to measure 
how profitable a bank is relative to its assets. In order to isolate the liquidity measures 
the following equation for ROA has been used: 
𝑹𝑶𝑨 =  𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 + 𝑵𝒐𝒏 − 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏  +   
 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 
Assuming banks don’t pass on the costs to customers, and all else held equal, the LCR 
is expected to decrease ROA as banks move to holding more high quality, low-yielding 
assets. As the Basel III liquidity measures are more complex than the capital measures 
and are applicable from 2015, it is difficult to assess exactly how the banking sector will 
initially react. This study therefore aims to measure the profitability impact using a range 
from a relatively small to relatively significant liquidity movement. Furthermore, the 
model produced allows for an easy input of different measurement drivers which 
measure profitability impact. Therefore, using the 2012 figures under Basel II, the non-
interest margin and special income margin is held constant while a decrease of 10, 20 
and 25 basis points in the NIM is modelled to measure the impact on profitability for the 
South African banking sector.  
The NSFR addresses maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2010a:25). This can be referred to as funding risk and to 
assess the ratios impact on profitability the model takes a more in depth look at NIM. 
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Whereas a NIM on total assets is used in the ROA and ROE calculations above, a NIM 
on interest-bearing assets is calculated in evaluating the NSFR impact. Interest-bearing 
assets are the loans and other securities banks earn income from and are therefore 
more relevant to this study. The following equation is used: 
𝐍𝐞𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧 = 𝐍𝐞𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐁𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬
Busch and Memmel (2014:1) state that a bank’s NIM is the cost of financial 
intermediation, which in turn can be split into maturity (or term) transformation, credit 
risk and liquidity and payment management. Maturity transformation entails granting 
loans that are long term in nature and accepting short-term deposits. This is exactly 
what the NSFR address by encouraging banks to hold more stable and longer term 
funding sources. Schmieder, et al. (2012:4) mentions that the Basel liquidity framework 
includes a component to assess risks arising from maturity transformation. 
Only Standard Bank provides a detailed maturity analysis in their annual reports and 
thus it is the only bank used to quantify maturity transformation. Standard Bank is the 
largest bank in South Africa in terms of total assets, contributing approximately 30% of 
the total banking assets in South Africa, as at 31 December 2012 (SARB, 2012; 
Standard Bank 2012 annual report). Standard Bank has therefore been used as a proxy 
for the South African banking sector to measure the NSFR’s effect on maturity 
transformation and ultimately profitability. 
The maturity of the major classes of assets and the contractual financial liabilities is split 
into three buckets, namely less than one month, one month to twelve months and longer 
than twelve months. The average maturity of assets and liabilities is then respectively 
calculated. Next, the South African yield curve is used to calculate maturity 
transformation by plotting the average maturities of assets and liabilities. The yields 
were obtained using data from the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) on the 27th 
January 2017. The difference in asset yield and liability yield is then determined to be 
maturity transformation. Once the maturity transformation is obtained, the difference to 
the NIM figure is the resultant liquidity and payment management and credit risk. Using 
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this breakdown of NIM credit risk and liquidity and payment management can be held 
constant, while reducing the maturity transformation (expected effect of NSFR) to 
assess the impact on the NIM, ROA and ROE. The cost of maturity transformation 
depends on the shape of the yield curve and will rise if the yield curve is steep. As the 
short end South Africa’s yield curve is only moderately steep, the study quantifies the 





The analysis commenced with a review of the five major South African banks’ 
expectations of the Basel III changes, prior to its implementation. An analytical model 
of the South African banking industry, together with a DuPont system of financial 
analysis was then used to measure the effect of the capital and liquidity changes under 
Basel III. Thereafter, a review of the actual profitability of the South African banking 
industry post Basel III implementation (year end 2013 and 2014) was assessed and 
discussed. Finally, market performance data for the South African banking industry was 
reviewed and compared to the findings of the modelled profitability and actual 
profitability of the representative bank. This section discusses the results of each stage 
of the analysis set out above as well as emerging insights. 
4.2 South African Banks’ Expectation of the Basel III Effect 
Regulatory reform is a key factor in South African banks’ strategic outlook and balance 
sheet positioning. This is largely due to the implementation of Basel III on 1 January 
2013. There are a host of challenges and implications on a bank that arise with the 
implementation of Basel III. 
A key theme that emerged upon review of the five major South African banks’ 2012 
annual reports with respect to Basel III was the challenge of implementing the new 
liquidity ratios (LCR and NSFR). LCR implementation is required from 2015 while NSFR 
is due for implementation in 2018. PWC’s 2014 analysis of the South African major 
banks highlights that compliance with the LCR will significantly impact the bank’s 
funding strategy in the short to medium term. 
Standard Bank South Africa (SBSA) mentions in their 2012 Annual Report that the group 
are taking several steps to ensure compliance with the two liquidity metrics. They have 
increased liquid asset buffers and developed liability products to reduce net cash 
outflows in preparation to meet the LCR requirement. SBSA further asserts that they 
are promoting product development and initiatives to extend the group’s funding base 
in order to comply with the NSFR. 
45 
According to the ABSA Group Limited 2012 Risk Report, the group will maintain a strong 
liquidity position and will work with the SARB to ensure compliance with the Basel III 
liquidity framework. The group highlights that they have surplus liquid assets under a 
month survival horizon and they are reassessing their strategy in relation to liquidity 
buffers. They do however mention that the NSFR remains a challenge given the 
structural features of the South African economy and this will be a key focus area for 
them going forward. 
Nedbank’s 2012 Annual Report also identifies the two liquidity ratios as a “key 
challenge”. They, however, believe that they are well positioned in respect of the LCR 
and, on a pro forma basis, are already compliant with the 2019 100% LCR requirement 
(assuming access to SARB’s committed liquidity facility). Nedbank go further, 
mentioning a number of steps they have taken to help meet the LCR requirement. Some 
of the steps include purchasing surplus level 1 assets, increasing the quantum of long-
term funding, investigating opportunities to structure new corporate lending in the form 
of corporate bonds versus traditional advances to increase the potential market capacity 
of level two assets and focusing on growing retail and commercial deposits. Much in the 
same manner as ABSA, Nedbank are more negative with respect to the NSFR and 
indicate that the structural challenges within the South African financial markets add to 
the challenge of compliance with this particular ratio. 
FirstRand Bank stress in their 2012 Annual Report that they anticipate a “significant 
impact” when implementing the LCR and NSFR rules. They expect the SARBs liquidity 
facility to alleviate some of the structural constraints to LCR compliance. They also 
expect the LCR to influence the bank’s funding strategy. Like FirstRand, Investec Bank 
appear very concerned in their 2012 annual report with respect to the new liquidity 
measures. They mention that the banking industry will find it difficult to meet the new 
liquidity ratios. They stress that a major focus area will be the need to reshape the nature 
of their deposit books towards more retail and longer-term funds, in order to meet the 
Basel III liquidity guidelines. They do not mention anything more specific regarding the 
impact of meeting the ratios but highlight the potential negative impact these ratios may 
have on the economy in general. 
According to PWC (South African Banking Survey, 2013), two of the big four South 
African banks ranked the impact of the NSFR as the most significant impact of Basel III. 
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From the 2012 reports it appears PWC are referring to ABSA and Nedbank who mention 
that the structural features of the South African economy ensures compliance with the 
NSFR will be challenging. The PWC report depicts this feature of the South African 
economy, with a graph displayed below (Figure 4.1). Extremely low discretionary retail 
savings in South Africa (refer to Figure 4.1) forces banks to rely on institutional funding 
– a less stable form of funding under Basel III.
Figure 4.1: Gross Savings as percentage of GDP. Source: SARB Annual Economic Report (2012). 
The NSFR requires banks to fund assets with longer-dated, more stable sources of 
funding. This will create challenges in many emerging market economies, not just South 
Africa. High maturity transformation is prevalent in the South African banking sector due 
to the short-term funding structure of the South African economy and the fact that banks 
have traditionally held long-dated assets, such as retail mortgages. It is therefore no 
surprise that the major South African banks view the NSFR as a significant challenge. 
From a capital adequacy perspective, the banks will face obvious pressures as the 
Basel III capital requirements increase along the implementation timeline. The South 
African banks have high capital ratios that will work in their favour. 
SBSA anticipate making adjustments to their business model in order to focus more on 
transactional banking, which is less capital-intensive and generates good annuity 
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income (2012 Annual Report). They plan to do this in order to manage the impact on 
profitability and ROE. Overall SBSA conclude that they expect a reduction in the group’s 
capital adequacy ratios but will remain adequately capitalised in meeting the new Basel 
III requirements. The Group’s 2012 Risk Report also states that they will be Basel III 
compliant with focus areas that include optimising capital and liquidity allocation 
between product lines, trading desks, industry sectors and legal entities that result in 
financial resources being allocated in a manner that enhances the overall group 
economic profit and return on equity (ROE). 
In their 2012 Annual Report Nedbank reported that their capital ratio’s had strengthened 
through 2012, rendering them well positioned to adopt Basel III. According to their 2012 
Risk Report, their remaining Basel III capital-related work included, amongst other 
points, issuing new Tier II debt capital that complies with the Basel III loss absorbency 
requirements and phasing out hybrid capital instruments. Nedbank further stated in the 
Annual Report that an upward revision of capital that was allocated to the different 
business clusters resulted in a dilution of the clusters ROE performance, given higher 
capital levels. They concluded that those enhancements had no impact on the group’s 
overall capital levels and ROE. 
ABSA Group Limited disclosed a strong capital position and mention that they will 
remain adequately capitalised after the implementation of Basel III (Risk Report, 2012). 
According to the report, they aim to maintain a strong, high quality and optimal mix of 
capital. Without disclosing any possible or specific effect to their profitability or capital 
ratios, ABSA stressed a number of times that they will meet the minimum requirements 
after the implementation of Basel III. 
FirstRand Bank does not expect a significant impact on their core Tier 1 ratio according 
to their 2012 Annual Report. They do expect a more pronounced negative effect on their 
total capital adequacy ratio (due to non-cumulative, non-redeemable preference share 
capital and subordinated debt instruments that do not meet the new loss absorbency 
criteria). Furthermore, FirstRand highlights a leverage ratio well in excess of the SARB’s 
minimum Tier 1 ratio of 4% and therefore believe this will provide no constraints to the 
bank. 
According to Investec Bank Limited’s 2012 Annual Report, they expect no problems in 
meeting the new Basel III requirements in time. They do expect a negative impact on 
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overall margins in the short to medium term. Investec, as with the liquidity ratios, do not 
mention any specific impact on their overall profitability with respect to the change in 
capital ratios. They reiterate that Basel III will have a strategic impact that will change 
the business models of banks worldwide, resulting in additional costs. 
Despite the increase in the minimum regulatory capital requirement under Basel III, the 
major South African banks more or less indicate that they will continue to hold additional 
capital buffers. They do not expect a significant impact to profitability as they are 
planning to manage the impact of the new requirements through balance sheet 
management processes. 
4.3 Results of Basel III Capital Change 
Table 4.1 below presents the results of an increase in capital using figures for the South 
African banking industry for the last year under Basel II (2012). Basel III changes require 
an increased holding of high quality capital. Holding all else equal, the analytical model 
therefore increases capital by an estimated 2% in order to assess what the impact on 





Profit 37 532 37 532 
Assets 3 387 591 3 387 591 
Total Equity 250 539 255 550 
Total Liabilities 3 137 052 3 132 041 
Net Profit Margin 13.45% 13.45% 
Asset Turnover 0.08 0.08 
ROA 1.11% 1.11% 
Gearing (Total Assets / Equity) 13.52 13.28 
ROE 14.98% 14.69% 
Change from 2012 actual -0.29%
Table 4.1: Increased capital change results 
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The results show that a 2% increase in equity (achieved by increasing the equity-to-
asset ratio and holding all else equal) results in a 0.29% decrease in ROE. 
4.4 Results of Basel III New Liquidity Ratios 
In order to manipulate the effect of the Basel III liquidity ratios on profitability, a NIM on 
interest earning assets was first calculated. The South African banking industry earned 
a net yield of 3.26% on interest earning assets for the year ended 2012 under Basel II, 
as calculated in Table 4.2 below. 
Net Interest Income 83 716 
Interest Earning Assets 2 569 789 
Net Interest Margin 3.26% 
Table 4.2: NIM on interest earning assets 
Second, the average maturity of assets and liabilities was calculated in order to 
determine the maturity transformation component of the NIM on interest earning assets. 
The average maturity of the South African banking sector (using Standard Bank as a 
proxy) liabilities was “less than 1 month”, as at 31 December 2012. Using the South 
African yield curve, the one-month rate was 7.1348. The average maturity of assets was 
“longer than 12 months”. Through analysing Standard Bank Group’s 2012 Risk Report, 
an asset maturity of three years was deemed to be a feasible estimate. The yield on a 
three-year instrument was 7.9865. 
A maturity transformation of 0.8517 (7.9865 – 7.1348) was therefore calculated for 
2012. This implied liquidity and payment plus a credit risk figure of 2.4083 (being the 
difference between the NIM and maturity transformation). 
 Table 4.3 below presents the results on NIM for a 10, 20 and 25 basis point decrease 
in maturity transformation. The results breakdown the NIM into maturity transformation 
and liquidity management, as well as credit risk, and display the 0.1%, 0.2% and 0.25% 
decrease in NIM due to the corresponding decrease in maturity transformation. 
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2012 -0.1 -0.2 -0.25
Avg. Maturity of Assets 3 year yield 7.9865 
Avg. Maturity of Liabilities 
1 month yield 
7.1348 
Maturity Transformation 0.8517 0.7517 0.6517 0.6017 
Liquidity Mgmt. & Credit Risk 2.4083 2.4083 2.4083 2.4083 
NIM 3.26 3.16 3.06 3.01 
Table 4.3: NIM effect due to a decrease in maturity transformation 
The effect on ROA and ROE after applying a 0.1%, 0.2% and 0.25% decrease to NIM, 
holding all else equal, was then calculated. Firstly the impact on ROA was measured 
using the formula of ROA = NIM + non-interest margin + special income margin (holding 
non-interest margin and special income margin constant). Thereafter, the impact on 
ROE was measured using the DuPont formula where ROE = ROA x gearing (gearing 
held constant). 
2012 -0.1 -0.2 -0.25
Net Interest Margin 2.47% 2.37% 2.27% 2.22% 
Non-Interest Margin -0.28% -0.28% -0.28% -0.28%
Special Income Margin -1.08% -1.08% -1.08% -1.08%
ROA 1.11% 1.01% 0.91% 0.86% 
Gearing (Total Assets / Equity) 13.52 13.52 13.52 13.52 
ROE 14.98% 13.63% 12.28% 11.60% 
Table 4.4: ROA and ROE effect due to a decrease in maturity transformation 
Table 4.4 above illustrates the fairly significant impact on profitability of just a 0.1, 0.2 
and 0.25 percentage point decline in maturity transformation and therefore NIM. A 
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decrease of 0.1% in NIM results in a 1.35% decrease in ROE (falling from 14.98% to 
13.63%). A decrease in NIM of 0.2% and 0.25% resulted in a 2.7% and 3.38% decrease 
in ROE respectively. 
4.5 Actual Profitability of the South African Banking Sector 
South Africa has a sound and sophisticated banking system. South African banks tend 
to hold strong capital buffers and this is evidenced in Table 4.5 below. The results of the 
analytical model postulates that the South African banking sector is more than 








Total book assets 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
Risk weighted assets (RWA) 1 773 711 1 868 157 2 013 039 
RWA / total assets (%) 52.36% 52.21% 51.87% 
Total qualifying capital and reserves 277 647 291 809 302 299 
CET 1 Ratio 11.8% 11.6% 
Tier 1 Ratio 12.4% 12.5% 12.2% 
Total Ratio 15.7% 15.6% 15.0% 
Regulatory minimum total capital ratio 9.5% 9.5% 10.0% 
Table 4.5: Basel capital ratios 2012-2014 
The South African representative bank achieved a total capital adequacy ratio of 15.6% 
in 2013 (after the implementation of Basel III) and 15% in 2014. The CET1 ratio was 
11.8% in 2013 and remained steady at 11.6% in 2014. RWA assets increased steadily 
from 2012 through to 2014; however, RWA as a percentage of total assets decreased 
from 52.36% (2012) to 52.21% (2013) and 51.87% in 2014. 
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Using ROE and ROA as the key profitability measures, the South African banking sector 
actually looks healthier post Basel III implementation. The analytical model with the 
DuPont analysis does, however, show that ROE did decrease from 2012 (Basel II) to 
2013 (Basel III), thereafter increasing fairly significantly in 2014. ROA too increased 
from 2012 through to 2014 (refer to Table 4.6 below). Furthermore, the NIM (on total 







Net Profit Margin 13.45% 13.73% 13.92% 
Asset Turnover 0.08 0.08 0.08 
ROA 1.11% 1.11% 1.14% 
Gearing (Total Assets / Equity) 13.52 13.20 13.38 
ROE 14.98% 14.60% 15.23% 
Net Interest Margin 2.47% 2.66% 2.84% 
Non-Interest Margin -0.28% -0.47% -0.68%
Special Income Margin -1.08% -1.09% -1.01%
ROA 1.11% 1.11% 1.14% 
Table 4.6: South African banking sector profitability 2012-2014 
The South African banking sectors exposure to liquid or short-term assets has remained 
largely stable post the introduction of Basel III. Summing cash, government securities 
and other short-term securities off the balance sheet, the liquid asset exposure has 
decreased from 7.96% in 2012 to 7.75% in 2013 and finally down to 7.61% in 2014. 
Table 4.7 below provides the breakdown. 
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2012 2013 2014 
Total Assets 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
Cash Assets (cash/gov/short-term) 269 659 277 208 295 217 
Non-Cash Assets 3 117 932 3 300 788 3 585 480 
Liquid Asset % 7.96% 7.75% 7.61% 
Table 4.7: South African banking sectors exposure to short-term assets 
On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, short-term funding or deposits as a 
percentage of liabilities and equity has remained stable and slightly increased after the 
implementation of Basel III. The South African banking sector’s exposure to deposits as 
a percentage of liabilities and equity increased from 75.02% in 2012 to 76.44% in 2014. 
Table 4.8 below presents the breakdown. 
2012 2013 2014 
Amounts owed to depositors 2 541 373 2 712 158 2 966 268 
Total equity and liabilities 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
% Deposits 75.02% 75.80% 76.44% 
Table 4.8: South African banking sector’s exposure to short-term funding 
On the assets side, the maturity breakdown (using Standard Bank as a proxy) has also 
remained fairly stable post the Basel III implementation. Table 4.8 below illustrates the 
assets broken down into three maturity buckets, namely ‘less than 1 month’, ‘1 to 12 
months’ and ‘greater than 12 months’. 
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Assets < 1 month 1 - 12 months > 12 months
2012 (Basel II) 19.55% 14.65% 65.80% 
2013 (Basel III) 19.30% 13.43% 67.83% 
2014 (Basel III) 19.63% 14.25% 66.12% 
Table 4.9: Assets maturity analysis 
As Table 4.9 shows, 65.80% of assets had a greater maturity than 12 months under 
Basel II in 2012 and this increased to 67.83% in 2013 before falling slightly to 66.12% 
in 2014. No significant movements in assets with a maturity of less than one month 
occurred after the Basel III adoption. 
The liabilities maturity breakdown on the other hand experienced more notable 
fluctuations in comparison to assets for the same period under review. Table 4.10 shows 
that liabilities with a one-month maturity increased from 60.43% in 2012 to 67.45% in 
2014. Furthermore, liabilities with maturity greater than 12 months decreased from 
19.21% in 2012 to 17.16% in 2014. 
Liabilities < 1 month 1 - 12 months > 12 months
2012 (Basel II) 60.43% 20.37% 19.21% 
2013 (Basel III) 66.48% 17.38% 16.14% 
2014 (Basel III) 67.45% 15.38% 17.16% 
Table 4.10: Liabilities maturity analysis 
4.6 Market Performance of the South African Banking Sector 
The market performance of the South African Banks Index displays a drop in 2013 in 
and then a significant jump in 2014, as can be seen by Figure 4.2 below. The PE ratio 
of the Banking Index highlights a fall in bank valuations from around roughly the five-
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year average (2010-2014) in 2012 under Basel II to 2013 under Basel III. Thereafter, a 
significant increase occurred in the PE ratio to 2014. 
Figure 4.2: PE ratio of the South African banking industry (2012-2014). Source: Bloomberg (JSE 
Banks Index). 
4.6 Discussion of Results 
4.6.1 Capital changes under Basel III 
The results from measuring the capital change on the profitability of the South African 
banking sector are consistent with the McKinsey (2010) study on European and 
American banks. One difference it that the McKinsey study measures the ROE impact 
at full Basel implementation in 2019, while this study focuses on the immediate impact 
post 1 January 2013 implementation. Considering South African banks are well 
capitalised, it is unlikely that the South African banking sector will be required to 
significantly increase equity in order to meet the Basel III enhanced capital 
requirements. It thus seems probable that even a 2% increase in equity (as was 
modelled in this study) will possibly not be immediately required by the banking sector. 
An in-depth analysis of RWA did not form part of this study but as can be seen from 
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implies that while RWA continue to rise South African banks will have to establish 
methods to increase capital in order to meet the increasing Basel capital ratio 
requirements. This will have to be either through earnings, a cut in dividends or new 
equity. As can be seen from Table 6.1, a 2% increase in equity (by increasing the equity-
to-asset ratio and all else held equal) will decrease ROE by 0.29%. The South African 
banking sector will need to find ways to mitigate this negative profitability impact should 
they be required to increase equity at some point during the full 2019 phase in period. 
The actual profitability results of the model South African bank created, more or less fell 
in line with the five individual banks’ expectations of the Basel III capital change impact. 
The five banks indicated in 2012 that they will continue to hold additional capital buffers 
and did not expect a significant impact from the capital changes under Basel III. The 
capital ratios of the modelled South African bank in 2013 and 2014 remained strong 
exactly as the individual banks said they would in 2012. The capital adequacy ratios 
reflected a strong capital buffer and indicated that good capital management procedures 
have been implemented by the sector in the recent past. The results are promising, 
indicating that the South African banking sector is currently compliant and also ready to 
be fully compliant with the final Basel III capital rules by 2019. It is also important to note 
that the CET1 ratio has remained resilient well above the regulatory minimum 
requirement. The total capital adequacy ratio has decreased from 15.6% in 2013 to 15% 
in 2014 and the 2015 and 2016 results would need to be evaluated to establish if a 
declining trend emerges. The 7.76% increase in RWA from 2013 to 2014 is likely a 
major contributor to the decline in the capital adequacy ratio. Despite this, there is little 
evidence to suggest the South African banking sector will struggle to meet the increased 
capital requirements under Basel III over the forthcoming years. 
With respect to profitability it is difficult to isolate the Basel III impact in the numbers 
considering the numerous factors that affect a bank’s ROE and ROA. Banks are also 
easily able to pass on the cost of having to hold increased capital to borrowers. 
Assessing lending rates is not part of this study, however this is an example of the 
difficulty in drawing conclusions of the pure Basel III effect on actual profitability figures 
post 1 January 2013.  
The South African representative bank illustrated that ROA remained constant in 2013 
after the Basel III implementation and then increased marginally from 1.11% to 1.14% 
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in 2014. ROE experienced a relatively small decline in 2013, which corroborates the 
empirical analysis performed on the capital and liquidity changes under Basel III. 
Effectively, the ROE of the South African banking industry decreased under the first 
year of the Basel III adoption. 
2014 and the second year under Basel III illustrates a significant increase in ROE for 
the representative bank. ROE moved from 14.98% in 2012, to 14.60% in 2013 and then 
jumps to 15.23% in 2014. Furthermore the NIM also improved after the implementation 
of Basel III. 
The increase in ROE in 2014 (the second year under Basel III) for the South African 
bank, does not necessarily contradict the results of this study (see Section 4.2) or the 
McKinsey study referenced by the BCBS. Bank performance is sensitive to 
macroeconomic factors such as monetary policy, just as an example. Rising interest 
rates improve banks’ interest income and therefore profit margins. The SARB increased 
interest rates by 75 basis points during 2014. This is evidenced by the fairly significant 
increase in net profit margin in 2014 (see Table 4.6). This is consistent with a study by 
Borio, Gambacorta and Hofmann (2015) on 109 banks in 14 economies that found a 
positive relationship between short-term interest rates and bank profitability. The 
increase in interest rates in 2014 therefore accounts for a large portion of the rise in 
profitability for the South African banking sector. 
4.6.2 Liquidity changes under Basel III 
The results from measuring the impact of the Basel III liquidity ratios suggest a 
significant profitability impact for the South African banking sector. NIM, ROA and ROE 
will all be negatively affected by the introduction of the LCR and NSFR. This falls in line 
with the individual bank’s expectations summarised in Section 4.1, where all five major 
South African banks unequivocally stressed the challenges in meeting the LCR and 
NSFR. 
This study assessed the impact of the LCR and NSFR collectively as a relationship 
between the two ratios was evident. The LCR requires banks to hold enough HQLA to 
survive a one-month stress period. Increasing liquid assets also increases the 
numerator of the NSFR and therefore assists in meeting the requirement in addition to 
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the LCR. Banks ultimately face a trade-off between mitigating liquidity risk and the 
opportunity cost of holding liquid assets. 
With respect to liquidity, banks aim to find a balance between this and profitability. The 
Basel III liquidity ratios force banks to hold an increased level of high quality assets but 
their generally lower returns present profitability challenges. The results in this study of 
decreasing maturity transformation while holding all else equal, indicates that South 
Africa is not immune to these challenges.  
The results are consistent with the findings of King (2013), Molyneux and Thorton (1992) 
and Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004), to name a few. King (2013) finds that 
strategies adopted to meet the NSFR will reduce banks’ NIM fairly significantly. 
Molyneux and Thorton (1992) found a significant inverse relationship between liquidity 
and profitability. Similarly, Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) found a negative 
relationship between liquidity and profitability in a study on European banks.  
The decrease in NIM’s from the Basel III liquidity requirements is fully expected as 
HQLA are typically low interest yielding. However, relatively small declines in maturity 
transformation and thus NIM will translate into significant declines in ROE as illustrated 
in Table 4.4. A decline in maturity transformation of 10 basis points caused a 1.35% 
decrease in ROE; a 20 basis point decline resulted in a 2.7% decrease; and a 25 basis 
point decline resulted in a 3.38% decrease in ROE. This translates into a significant 
inverse relationship between the Basel III liquidity measures and profitability for the 
South African banking sector. 
The assessment of the liquid assets percentage for the South African banking sector, 
displayed in Table 4.7, possibly presents a contradiction. Liquid assets as a percentage 
of total assets have in fact decreased from 7.96% in 2012 to 7.75% in 2013 and to 
7.61% in 2014. This suggests that there has not been a push from the sector to increase 
HQLA. It is important to note that HQLA contains certain covered bonds that have not 
been included in this calculation. The liquid assets percentage simply includes cash, 
government securities and other short-term securities. Despite the bonds exclusion, the 
results of the analytical model suggest there has been no push to increase HQLA in the 
years leading up to the LCR requirement in 2015. Most of the five major banks did 
indicate they were well placed to meet the mandatory 2015 LCR requirement of 60%. 
This could imply one or a combination of the following: 
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 The South African banking sector already had enough HQLA to be compliant
with the LCR in the years preceding the 2015 requirement; or
 A late push into further HQLA in the 2015 financial year occurred; or
 South African banks are making use of the CLF provided by the SARB; or
 Banks have been adjusting their in-and outflows to ensure compliance with the
LCR.
Cash inflow and outflow information necessary to calculate the LCR was not available 
in banks’ annual reports for the 2012 to 2014 period under review. The effect of net 
flows on the LCR has therefore not been assessed in this study. 
South Africa’s capital market has limited availability of government debt securities and 
this is the reason why the BCBS made provisions for CLFs (which was adopted by the 
SARB). The availability of HQLA is expected to be a concern for South African banks 
and this is arguably the reason for the stable liquid assets percentage between 2012 
and 2014 presented in Table 4.7. These results thus do not come as a total surprise 
despite the onset of the LCR in 2015. South African banks can make use of the CLF in 
order to meet the LCR requirement. Extensive research into the use of CLFs does not 
form part of this study. 
The maturity analysis (using Standard Bank as a proxy) of assets also supports the 
above finding that there was no movement towards holding more HQLA as at 31 
December 2014. Table 4.9 illustrates that the percentage assets with a maturity of less 
than one month had barely increased from 2012 to 2014.  
While there has been no real movement in HQLA between 2012 and 2014, the results 
in Table 4.8 indicate that some movement in meeting the Basel III liquidity measures 
has taken place on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. The exposure to deposits as 
a percentage of liabilities and equity increased from 75.02% in 2012 under Basel II to 
76.44% in 2014 under Basel III. Due to the difficulty in obtaining the information, 
unfortunately this study has not unpacked deposits in order to establish the breakdown 
between more stable customer deposits and less stable wholesale funding. However, 
as stated earlier and depicted in Figure 4.1 the South African banking sector mostly 
relies on wholesale funding. The BCBS reiterates this by stating that South African 
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banks are largely funded by domestic deposits with 25% retail and 75% wholesale 
deposits (Bank for International Settlements, 2015:7). If the increase in percentage of 
deposits between 2012 and 2014 has simply occurred due to an increase in short-term 
wholesale funding then the South African banking sector has not made much progress 
towards NSFR compliance. 
The aforementioned statement is supported by the liabilities maturity analysis illustrated 
in Table 4.10. The percentage of liabilities with a maturity of less than one month was 
60.43% in 2012 and increased to 67.45% in 2014. This is a fairly significant increase 
within the space of three years and together with the fairly stable asset maturity over 
the same period (Table 4.9), indicates that there has been no push to reduce maturity 
transformation thus far. Implementation of the NSFR only commences in January 2018; 
however, leaving the banks with some time to effect changes and meet the new liquidity 
ratio. 
Overall, Table 4.10 suggests that debt maturity did in fact reduce between 2012 and 
2014, with the NSFR still a few years away. A reduction in debt maturity implies lower 
interest expense and therefore a higher NIM. This further supports the higher profitability 
achieved by the South African banking sector in 2014, illustrated in Table 4.6. 
4.6.3 Market performance data 
To support the findings of this study, market performance data of the JSE Banking Index 
indicates a similar story to the modelled profitability and representative bank’s actual 
profitability for the period 2012 to 2014. In 2012 and the last year under Basel II, the 
Banking Index PE ratio was roughly around the five year average. In 2013 and the first 
year under Basel III, a clear structural break occurs as the PE ratio fell from 12.24 (just 
less than the five year average) to 11.46. The PE ratio gauges the market’s assessment 
of the firm’s future (Leibowitz & Kogelman, 1990:2). Beaver and Morse (1978) have 
shown that the PE ratio can predict future earnings changes. The fall in the JSE Banking 
Index PE ratio in 2013 thus indicated a decline in earnings prospects or more risk to 
profits for the South African banking industry in 2013. This is not surprising as 
throughout this study it has been discussed how the new Basel III measures on capital 
and liquidity adopted in 2013 should raise the costs for banks from a pure accounting 
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perspective. The banking industry themselves have the same expectation. This 
indicates an opportunity cost for banks, which negatively affects the profitability and 
shareholder value of a bank (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010). 
The fall in the Banking Index’s PE ratio over the Basel changeover period (2012 to 2013) 
validates both the modelled profitability due to the capital and liquidity changes (sections 
4.2 and 4.3) and the actual profitability of the representative bank (Section 4.4). The 
modelled profitability highlighted a decline in profitability due to the new capital and 
liquidity measures under Basel III. Following this notion, the actual profitability of the 
representative bank fell from 14.98% in 2012 to 14.6% in 2013 and the first year under 
Basel III (Table 4.6). Therefore, the fall in JSE Banking Index PE ratio in 2013 after the 
initial implementation of Basel III agrees with the arguments presented in this study. 
Following the decline from 2012 to 2013 in the PE ratio of the JSE Banking Index (see 
Figure 4.2), the ratio significantly increased the following year in 2014. On face value 
this turnaround early during the Basel III phase in period goes against the expectations 
of increased costs and reduced profitability under the new measures. However, the 
Banking Index market data for 2014 falls in the line with the actual profitability of the 
South African representative bank, which also indicated a significant increase in 
profitability (see Table 4.6) in 2014. The increase in profitability for 2014 can be 
explained by the SARB’s increasing of interest rates during the period and therefore a 
huge jump in profit margins for banks. The increase in interest rates would have 
increased banks’ earnings growth rate that subsequently results in a higher PE ratio, 
which is exactly what the JSE Banking Index experienced in 2014.The market 
performance data for the JSE Banking Index therefore corroborates the findings of this 
study for the periods under review. 
4.6.4 Summary and implications 
Various strategies, some of them mentioned in this study, are available to banks in order 
to meet the Basel III enhanced capital ratios. The choice of strategy will more than likely 
be dependent on existing capital ratios. This study has reinforced the healthy capital 
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position of the South African banking sector and it is for this reason that no significant 
adjustments are required to meet the Basel III capital adequacy ratio. Therefore, despite 
the negative profitability impact of the new capital measure uncovered through this 
study, the South African banking sector is unlikely to be affected in the near term. The 
sector can safely plan ahead towards the full 2019 implementation requirements and 
their current high capital ratios provide them with sufficient flexibility in meeting those 
requirements. 
From a liquidity regulation standpoint, the general consensus from the industry is that 
South African banks will particularly struggle to meet the NSFR. The sector’s asset 
duration is considerably higher than liability duration as evidenced in this study. The 
Basel III liquidity measures require banks to reduce maturity transformation, thereby 
moving away from the current trend where long-term assets are funded by short-term 
liabilities. Due to this requirement of longer term funding and the overall negative 
profitability impacts demonstrated in this study, it is not unreasonable to expect banks 
to increase lending rates. Both the LCR and the NSFR will impact the cost of bank 
funding. A higher holding of HQLA, that is typically lower yielding, will place downward 
pressure on bank’s margins. 
Although this paper makes no attempt to quantify the effect on lending rates, the reality 
is that South African banks can pass on the costs of tighter regulation to consumers. 
Alternatively, banks will have to strategically reduce indirect lending costs by, for 
example, streamlining their lending process or enhancing automation. The more likely 
scenario, however, is for banks to increase lending rates. This is a widely anticipated 
response to the Basel III measures and therefore the vast majority of the Basel III 
studies have assessed impact on lending rates. In aggregate, the empirical evidence 
reported in the literature on Basel III and lending strongly suggests that an increase in 
capital and liquidity requirements will definitely increase lending rates or reduce lending 
in the long run. While most of the studies have been performed on the European market, 
it is not unreasonable to expect South African banks to follow suit given the negative 
profitability impact of Basel III demonstrated in this study. 
If the South African banking industry passes on the costs of meeting the Basel III liquidity 
measures (and the capital measures should they be required to increase capital) to 
consumers through increasing lending rates, of great concern will be the negative 
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impact on the South African economy due to higher interest rates and possibly reduced 
lending by banks. Higher interest rates as banks cover increased funding costs can 
depress economic activity and ultimately filter through to lower GDP growth (Slovik & 
Cournède, 2011). 
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5 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
5.1 Conclusion 
Empirical studies on the impact of Basel III are limited, having only recently gained 
momentum. The purpose of this study was to determine the profitability impact on the 
South African banking sector as a result of the change from Basel II to Basel III. There 
have been many changes in the new Basel Accord, however this study focused on the 
increased capital required and the new liquidity measures. 
The strategic questions around Basel III are extensive, rendering an integrated view of 
its necessary impact. The various impacts on banks’ profitability, business models and 
future actions make measuring the Basel III effect difficult. The difficulty is compounded 
by the vast possible behavioural responses from banks to the new regulation. All the 
research conducted on the Basel III impact thus far concentrates on one specific area 
in order to draw conclusions. In so doing, this study solely examined the effect on 
profitability and isolated the impact by holding bank behaviour constant. The study goes 
further to present a methodology for mapping higher capital and liquidity requirements 
on banks’ profitability. This provides researchers with a useful tool to study the impact 
of regulatory changes on the profitability of the South African banking sector. 
By employing an approach used by the BIS (King, 2010) that involved creating a 
representative bank and using accounting relationships, the results of this study indicate 
an inverse relationship between Basel III (or tighter capital and liquidity regulation) and 
profitability for the South African banking sector. The results of the Basel III capital 
change is in line with the BCBS ROE expectation in reference to a McKinsey study 
performed in 2010. The new Basel III liquidity measures yielded a more significant 
negative effect on profitability than the capital changes. This is consistent with the 
findings of King (2013) who finds that strategies adopted to meet the NSFR will reduce 
banks’ NIM fairly significantly; and Molyneux and Thorton (1992) who found a significant 
inverse relationship between liquidity and profitability. 
Despite the benefits, higher capital requirements and liquidity buffers result in additional 
costs. While the intention of the BCBS is clear, the literature around the effect of tighter 
capital and liquidity regulation is conflicting. Furthermore, the literature around the Basel 
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Accords and profitability is also unclear. Banks’ reactive measures to the tighter 
regulation can take on many forms, making measuring the effect complex. From a pure 
accounting perspective, the Basel III capital and liquidity measures are expected to 
negatively affect profitability in the short-term. The results of this study support this 
notion. This study confirms that Basel III will reduce profitability for the South African 
banking sector and the extent will depend on how much the sector needs to adjust to 
meet the various ratios. It is for this reason that over the recent past many South African 
banks mentioned in their annual and risk reports that they seek to manage the effect of 
Basel III by balance sheet restructuring and business model adjustments. 
The study effectively uses triangulation to strengthen the validity of the findings and 
create a deeper understanding of the Basel III changes. The model output is compared 
to three different sources of information (market data, actual profitability, and the 
relevant banks’ expectations summarised in their annual reports), thereby reducing 
inherent bias. Market data obtained for the period 2012 to 2014 supports the findings of 
the generated model and this study. The fall in the PE ratio of the JSE Banking Index 
during the changeover period from Basel II to Basel III corroborates the findings of the 
modelled profitability due to the Basel changes, the actual profitability of the 
representative bank, as well as the major South African banks’ expectations of the Basel 
III impact. 
In conclusion, this study strongly suggests that, despite the benefits of banking 
regulation, the Basel III measures in isolation, and specifically the liquidity ratios, will 
reduce profitability for the South African banking sector. Promising, however, is that the 
study confirms the South African banking sector remains well capitalised and thus well 
placed to meet the full 2019 capital requirements with minimal impact on expected 
profitability. Depending on the extent to which South African banks’ need to increase 
HQLA and reduce maturity transformation in order to meet the full LCR and NSFR, the 
profitability impact of these measures will be significant. One option available to the 
sector in adapting to meet these liquidity requirements to protect themselves against 
the significant negative profitability impacts, which is highlighted in this study, is to 
increase lending rates. As many previous Basel III studies on the impact of lending rates 
have concluded, this could lead to adverse side effects for the South African economy 
as a whole. 
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5.2 Limitations of the Study 
One of the banks used in this study, namely Investec Bank, does not have a December 
year-end and, therefore, September interim figures were used as a proxy for the South 
African representative bank. With respect to the evaluation of the impact of the NSFR 
on profitability, only one of the five South African banks used in this study had the 
necessary information publicly available. Standard Bank, the largest of the five banks in 
terms of total assets, was used as a proxy in the study. Moreover, most of the literature 
in existence and referenced in this study focuses on the United States and Europe. The 
severe lack of research conducted on the Basel Accords within an emerging market or 
specifically a South African context presented a challenge and further validated the 
need for this study. 
5.3 Opportunities for Further Studies 
There are certain aspects of Basel III that were not in the research scope of this study. 
The leverage ratio and the countercyclical capital buffers within a South African contest, 
as examples require research. Further studies on the use of the committed liquidity 
facility for certain jurisdictions like South Africa in meeting the Basel III liquidity 
measures also warrant investigation. The study focused on the five large banks in South 
African who make up more than 90% of total banking assets. It is worth further 
investigating the profitability effect on smaller South African banks that may not be as 
well capitalised and prepared to meet the Basel III deadlines. 
Bank capital may also affect banks’ ability to create liquidity and a strand of literature 
exists which assesses the link between bank capital and liquidity. This implies that 
compliance with the Basel capital ratios can affect compliance with the liquidity ratios 
and vice versa. Further research on the impact and link between the two sets of ratios 
is required. 
As the global financial crisis highlighted, the stability of the banking sector is 
fundamental to the well-being of the entire global economy. Insightful knowledge of how 
regulation affects the system is therefore important and requires empirical research. 
Unfortunately, not enough studies on the impact of the Basel Accords have been 
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Total book assets 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
Risk weighted assets (RWA) 1 773 711 1 868 157 2 013 039 
RWA / total assets 52.36% 52.21% 51.87% 
Table 6.1: South African banking sector RWA 2012-2014 
This table is an extract from the representative bank model illustrating the RWA for the 
period 2012 through to 2014. 
SA Model Bank Profit and Loss account (R million) 
Basel II Basel III Basel III 
2012 2013 2014 








Net interest income 83 716 95 328 110 094 
Impairment charges on loans and advances (24 642) (24 065) (22 384) 
Income from lending activities 59 074 71 263 87 710 
Non-interest revenue 85 335 86 641 88 691 
Operating Income 144 409 157 904 176 401 










Credit impairment charges (344) 1 (418) 
Revenue sharing arrangements with group companies (1 642) (1 646) (1 759) 
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Indirect taxation (2 537) (3 061) (3 479) 
Profit from operations before non-trading and capital items 47 010 51 559 57 660 
Non-trading and capital items (48) (59) (96) 
Revaluation of investment properties (1) 4 0 
Profit from operations 46 961 51 504 57 564 
Share of profits of associate companies and joint arrangements 334 190 635 
Total direct taxation (9 763) (12 094) (14 033) 
Profit for the year 37 532 39 600 44 166 
Other comprehensive income net of taxation 1 856 206 148 
Exchange differences on translating foreign operations 490 1 355 294 
Fair-value adjustments on available-for-sale assets 1 563 (1 046) 151 
Re-measurements on long-term employee benefit assets (201) 454 (247) 
Gains on property revaluations 39 218 163 
Net change in fair value on cash flow hedges 297 (262) 53 
Realised fair value adjustments on cash flow hedges transferred 
to P&L (332) (513) (266) 
Taxation on other comprehensive income (101) 96 0 
Total comprehensive income for the year 39 287 39 902 44 314 
Table 6.2: South African representative bank profit and loss 2012-2014 
70 
SA Model Bank Balance Sheet (R million) 
Basel II Basel III Basel III 
2012 2013 2014 
Assets 
Cash and cash equivalents 107 706 117 059 113 484 
Other short-term securities 37 575 35 004 56 322 
Derivative financial instruments 162 154 129 109 110 573 
Government and other securities 124 378 125 145 125 411 
Loans and advances 2 398 214 2 597 002 2 834 320 
Trading assets 118 646 114 928 142 925 
Hedging assets 5 439 3 344 2 335 
Pledged assets 5 706 4 394 5 281 
Other assets 33 969 26 190 22 997 
Non-sovereign and non-bank cash placements 9 859 7 722 10 403 
Reverse repurchase agreements and cash collateral on 
securities borrowed 8 970 6 067 6 764 
Bank debt securities 24 095 22 247 22 585 
Other debt securities 6 099 10 673 11 836 
Own originated loans and advances to customers securitised 2 337 2 347 3 055 
Other securitised assets 1 071 1 629 804 
Accounts receivable 3 398 3 631 3 839 
Commodities 8 003 6 894 6 271 
Current taxation receivable 967 1 112 1 431 
Investment securities 171 575 183 282 212 382 
Non-current assets held for sale 2 654 1 869 997 
Amounts due by holding company and subsidiary 21 539 24 270 26 975 
Investments in associate companies & JV 66 292 82 755 78 448 
Deferred taxation asset 308 163 324 
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Investment property 416 328 337 
Property and equipment 32 762 35 230 38 263 
Long-term employee benefit assets 5 280 2 847 4 409 
Mandatory reserve deposits with central banks 12 641 13 199 14 843 
Goodwill and Intangible assets 15 538 19 556 23 083 
Total assets 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
Liabilities 
Derivative financial instruments 167 993 142 485 136 695 
Amounts owed to depositors 2 541 373 2 712 158 2 966 268 
Trading liabilities 73 510 76 677 69 479 
Other liabilities 44 103 39 476 40 684 
Repurchase agreements and cash collateral on securities lent 18 954 15 581 12 511 
Liabilities on securitisation of loans and advances 2 934 2 659 970 
Liabilities on securitisation of other assets 492 572 154 
Current taxation liabilities 4 210 4 666 4 519 
Creditors and accruals 6 532 7 820 9 187 
Other liabilities held for sale 213 175 0 
Deferred taxation liabilities 2 865 2 044 1 586 
Provisions 1 616 1 640 2 245 
Debt securities in issue 107 672 102 258 110 416 
Borrowed Funds 17 907 15 762 10 535 
Subordinated debt / Tier II Debt 41 353 38 844 41 247 
Long-term employee benefit liabilities 9 285 7 335 9 509 
Long-term debt instruments 30 295 33 265 35 634 
Liabilities to group companies 65 745 103 425 138 998 
Total liabilities 3 137 052 3 306 842 3 590 637 
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Ordinary share capital 424 426 426 
Ordinary share premium 94 413 97 372 100 372 
Reserves 144 307 161 960 177 872 
Total equity attributable to equity holders 239 144 259 758 278 670 
Preference share capital and premium 11 205 11 205 11 205 
Minority shareholder's equity attributable to ordinary 
shareholders 190 191 185 
Total equity 250 539 271 154 290 060 
Total equity and liabilities 3 387 591 3 577 996 3 880 697 
Table 6.3: South African representative bank balance sheet 2012-2014 
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